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ABSTRACT
In this study I examine the creation at the Philadelphia Convention of the 
Electoral College for the election of the President of the United States. I then examine the 
debate on the constitutional provisions regulating the election of the United States 
president and vice-president during the process of ratification of the United States 
Constitution. I finally examine the actual operation of that electoral system in the first 
federal election.
I draw on a body of published primary sources that includes primarily the records 
of the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, the records of the debates in the several state 
conventions on the adoption of the United States Constitution, particularly with regard to 
the years 1787-1788, and the records of the first federal election of 1788-1790.
This subject matter provides valuable information for further understanding the 
political culture of the Revolutionary period. In particular, my argument is that the 
creation of the Electoral College and its operation in the first federal election reveal the 
remarkable degree to which partisanship was involved in the process of selecting George 
Washington and John Adams as, respectively, the first president and the first vice- 
president of the United States. I put my interpretation within the context of the relevant 
historiography on the subject.
THE ORIGINS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
The Creation of the Electoral College through the First Federal Elections
INTRODUCTION
The Electoral College was one of the ingenious creations that came out of the 
Philadelphia Convention, and has been a controversial peculiarity of American 
constitutionalism ever since. After the 2000 election many American voters realized for 
the first time how complicated its machinery is. They also realized that it is not a purely 
democratic electoral system which every four years establishes who will dwell in the 
White House, but one that reflects the federal character of the United States government. 
They understood that with their vote they had actually elected electors o f the president, 
and not the president himself. And they found that the electors they had entrusted could 
overthrow their vote and give it to a candidate different from the one they favored, even 
if this is a more theoretical than real possibility, which until now has occurred only rarely 
in American history.
Over the years many have criticized this electoral scheme, which has provoked 
the highest number of amendments introduced in Congress for a single constitutional 
provision. But, with the exception o f the twelfth amendment, which introduced the single 
electoral ticket for both the president and the vice-president, and the twenty-second 
amendment, which limited the president’s tenure in office to two consecutive terms, all 
the reforms proposed have been defeated. The changes the state legislatures have 
provided for choosing the presidential electors and the development of the two-party 
system, of which the introduction of the twelfth amendment was a consequence, have
2
3stressed the federal character of the presidential election and have made it virtually direct. 
Yet its original design is in many respects unaltered and continues to be the object of 
political controversies.
It is indeed a sign of the complexity of executive power that the problem of the 
presidential election was also hotly debated at the Philadelphia Convention, by the very 
statesmen who conceived the mechanism of the Electoral College. The framers discussed 
the mode of election for the president on twenty-one different days and voted on it over 
thirty times during the proceedings of the Convention. Several schemes of congressional, 
direct, and indirect popular election were put forward. The final draft of the Electoral 
College was proposed by the Committee on Unfinished Parts only on September the 4th
thand approved, after the introduction of minor amendments, on the 7 , three and a half 
months after the Convention had opened and ten days before the delegates signed the 
Constitution and submitted it to the states for approval.1
The whole problem of defining the position of the president in the constitutional 
framework was one of the most difficult and dividing issues the framers confronted. To 
begin with, the idea of an elective national magistrate vested with executive power was in 
many respects a novelty. When the American Revolution broke out, no recent nor 
significant historical precedent stood as an example for the rebels who were building new 
republican governments in the former British colonies. They had to look back to ancient 
Greece and Rome, whose greatness no modem republic had been able to match. Tme,
1 According to Shlomo Slonim, “no other constitutional provision gave [the framers] so much difficulty in 
its formulation.” Shlomo Slonim, “The Electoral College at Philadelphia: The Evolution of an Ad Hoc 
Congress for the Selection of a President,” Journal of American History 73 (1986), p. 35.
4they drew on the rich tradition of European constitutional thought as well as the works of 
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Republican thinkers. John Locke and Montesquieu, 
who had advocated the separation of powers between the branches of government, and 
the political as well as practical necessity of an independent executive power, were 
already well known in America. In his Second Treatise o f Government, Locke wrote: 
“The good of the society requires that several things should be left to the discretion of 
him that has the executive power... For the legislators not being able to foresee and 
provide by laws for all that may be useful to the community, the executor of the laws, 
having the power in his hands, has by the common law of Nature a right to make use of it 
for the good of the society.” But Locke, as did Montesquieu, was referring to a hereditary 
monarch, namely the English “King in Parliament,” as he would be conceived after the 
Glorious Revolution of 1688. When both Locke and Montesquieu theorized the 
separation of powers, they were also defending the prerogative of the crown. And if as 
early as 1656 James Harrington had put forward the idea of an elective executive in The 
Commonwealth o f  Oceana, such an idea remained the peculiarity of largely unheard 
republican theorists. A century later in his influential Commentaries on the Laws o f  
England, the English jurist William Blackstone discarded it because it would result in 
“periodical bloodshed and misery.”
In fact, while drafting their new constitutions, the American revolutionaries most 
of all reacted to the stubborn authoritarianism of George III, so vehemently condemned
2 John Locke, Two Treatises o f Government (New York, Mentor Books, 1965), 159; William Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws o f England: A Facsimile o f the First Edition o f1765-1769. 4 vols. (Chicago, 
University of Chicago Press, 1979), 1:186.
5by Thomas Jefferson in the Declaration of Independence. This antimonarchical stance, 
with its implied opposition to regal prerogative, resulted in a fundamental rebuttal of the 
separation of powers. In the newborn state republics the governors were made directly 
dependent on the legislatures, and stripped of the major powers that they had enjoyed in 
the colonies as the agent of the English crown. Under the Articles of Confederation the 
president was also dependent on the legislature and merely presided over Congress.
The years following the outbreak of the Revolution witnessed rapid developments 
in politics, of which the democratization of the state legislatures and the increasing 
inadequacy of the Confederation were major cases. The Philadelphia Convention was 
conceived of as a means to confront such developments, and to the advocates of political 
consolidation the empowerment of the executive, which had already been attempted in 
New York and Massachusetts with the introduction of the constitutions of 1777 and 1780, 
and had been proposed in the Continental Congress by superintendent of finance Robert 
Morris, was instrumental to a design aimed at restraining the rising populism of 
American politics and the ineffectiveness of the Confederation. Confronting what they 
now considered the perils of unchecked legislative assemblies and increasingly factious 
political majorities, the framers thus reinterpreted the principle of the separation of 
powers. But the definition of the executive power, particularly a national executive within 
a new continental government, was by no means easy. As late as April 16, 1787, only a
3 As Jack Rakove noted, “the evisceration of the executive power was the most conspicuous aspect of the 
early state constitutions.” Jack Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the 
Constitution (New York, Knopf, 1996), 250. A broad treatment of this aspect of Revolutionary politics and 
its theoretical assumptions is in Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 
(Chapel Hill, North Carolina, University of North Carolina Press, 1969), particularly chapters IV-VI.
6month before the opening of the convention, James Madison wrote to George 
Washington and confessed his difficulty in conceiving the very nature of a national 
executive: “I have scarcely ventured as yet to form my own personal opinion either of the 
matter in which he ought to be constituted or of the authorities with which he ought to be 
cloathed.” His difficulty would be that of many at Philadelphia, where the lack of 
consistent historical precedents, the persistence of the antimonarchical stance, and the 
disagreement between the delegates over the nature of the future national government, 
made the definition of the executive particularly challenging. “[T]o unite a proper energy 
in the Executive and a proper stability in the Legislature departments,” as Madison 
explained to Jefferson after the convention, was “peculiarly embarrassing.”4
The choice of the mode of election of the president was part of the framers’ effort 
to create the presidency. As such, it was interconnected with other important issues, since 
it would affect the representativeness, the independence, and therefore the authority of 
the executive within the national government. The election of the president by the 
legislature would result in his dependence on it, weakening his appeal among the people, 
and undermining the separation of powers many favored. Depending on the nature of 
representation in Congress, such mode of election would prove palatable either to the 
states with large electorates or to those with small ones. Had Congress been elected by 
the people at large, Congressional election would be favored by the states with large
4 Madison to Washington, in William T. Hutchinson, ed., The Papers of James Madison, 17 vols.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962-1991), 9: 385. Madison to Jefferson, October 24, 1787, 
Papers, 10:207-208. According to Marton J. Frish, “at the time of the Constitutional Convention virtually 
none of the delegates, with the exception of Alexander Hamilton, Gouvemeur Morris and James Wilson, 
were cognizant of a role for executive power in a republican government beyond that of law enforcement 
and administration.” Marton J. Frish, “Executive Power and Republican Government -  1787,” Presidential 
Studies Quarterly 17, Spring 1987, p. 281.
7electorates, while it would be opposed by the states with small electorates, because the 
former would be, in terms of numbers, more influential in the choice of the president. On 
the other hand, if Congress were to represent the states, as it was under the Articles of 
Confederation, Congressional election would be supported by the states with small 
electorates, because this way electoral size would not matter and each state would be 
granted an equal share in the presidential election. Popular election would save the 
separation of powers and create an independent executive with greater authority and 
national character as one powerful unifying symbol for the newborn nation. Indirect 
popular election would meet the expectations of those who, given the size of the nation 
and the increase of factions and partisanship, were concerned about the practical as well 
as political feasibility of direct popular election. Finally, two other issues further 
complicated the matter: terms of office and eligibility for reelection. Depending on their 
mix, the president would be held more or less accountable, whether by the legislature or 
the people.
The Electoral College provided what the framers considered a viable middle 
ground for the solution of all these issues. Yet, their virtually unanimous satisfaction with 
the original mechanism they had devised was not always matched by an equally positive 
appraisal from those who were asked to ratify the new constitution. Furthermore, from 
the first federal elections, the Electoral College only partially worked as the framers had 
claimed it would, particularly with regard to the election of the vice-president, who was 
also chosen through the Electoral College. What the framers failed to envision was the 
remarkable influence exerted by rapidly developing national parties. These proved
8pivotal in determining the actual operation of the first Electoral College, and their 
existence defeated the main purpose of indirect elections, that of keeping the selection of 
both the president and the vice-president out of the reach of political factions.
The records of the Philadelphia Convention provide ample evidence with regard 
to the issues that were at stake in the framing of the presidential election as well as the 
difficulty the framers confronted while conceiving of the Electoral College. The first part 
of this thesis, which covers the proceedings of the convention, is mainly based on those 
records. The debate during the ratification of the Constitution in the several states and the 
first federal election, the regulation and the proceedings of that election, and private 
correspondences from the period provide further evidence with regarding to the framers’ 
intentions as well as the reception of their ideas in the political environment of the time. 
The latter set of documents constitute the foundation for the second part of this study.5
5 The great body of primary sources for the proceeding of the Philadelphia Convention, the debates on the 
ratification of the Constitution, and the first federal elections are reprinted in respectively Max Farrand, ed., 
The Records o f the Federal Convention o f1787. A vols. (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1911); Merrill 
Jensen et al., eds., The Documentary History o f the Ratification of the Constitution. 19 vols. (Madison:
State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1976-); and Merrill Jensen et al., eds., The Documentary History of 
the First Federal Elections, 1788-1790. 4 vols. (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976). In this 
study I also rely on Jonathan Elliot, ed., The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of 
the Federal Constitution (Salem, N.H.: Ayer, 1987), and on Herbert J. Storing, ed., The Complete Anti- 
Federalist (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). From now on, those collections of primary 
sources will be abbreviated as respectively RFC, DHRC, DHFFE, DSSC, and CAF.
CHAPTER I
THE FRAMING OF THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE
The first scheme of election of the national executive discussed at Philadelphia 
was that outlined in the Virginia Plan, the proposal for national consolidation drafted by 
Virginia’s delegates and presented by Governor Edmund Randolph on May 29, 1787, 
four days after the opening of the Convention. The Virginia Plan provided for a national 
executive “to be chosen by a National Legislature,” and “to be ineligible a second time.” 
The executive was to join the judiciary in a council of revision. The office was also to 
enjoy a limited veto. The number of magistrates who would compose the executive and 
the length of the term of office were not specified. On June 1 the Convention begun to 
debate the scheme, and James Wilson of Pennsylvania soon stood out as a major 
advocate for a strong executive. Wilson’s first struggle was that for a single office, which 
alone, he contended, would provide it with the necessary “energy, dispatch and 
responsibility.” His proposal was aimed to achieve further consolidation, but it met the 
immediate opposition of Randolph, who regarded a unitary executive as “the foetus of 
monarchy.” Madison favored it, but only if it would be “aided by a council, who should 
have the right to advise and record their proceedings, but not to control his authority.” 
Roger Sherman of Connecticut simply “wished the number might not be fixed.” He 
maintained that the legislature “should be at liberty to appoint one or more as experience
9
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might dictate.”1
Randolph well embodied the antimonarchical stance at the Convention, while also 
expressing the concerns of those who opposed excessive consolidation. By the same 
token, Sherman envisioned a weak executive in the hands of the legislature, as governors 
were in most of the states. Madison, in contrast, endorsed the idea of concentrating the 
authority of the executive on a single person, but he still felt obliged to maintain the 
provision of a council. This arrangement resembled the balance of powers in the state 
governments, where, with the sole exception of Pennsylvania, the executive was unitary 
and a council directly elected by the people advised and checked the governor. The idea
of a vigorous and independent executive was still far from winning the support of the
• •  •  ■ • 2majority of the delegates, including Madison, the great architect of the Convention.
Despite such resistance, the following day, June 2, Wilson took a further step.
This time he outlined the first scheme of indirect popular election presented at the 
Convention, providing that the states would be “divided into Districts,” and that “the 
persons, qualified to vote in each District,” would “elect Members for their respective 
Districts to be electors of the Executive Magistracy.” A similar Electoral College had 
been introduced in Maryland in 1776, and proposed, though unsuccessfully, at the New 
York constitutional convention of 1777. Drafted by the wealthiest and most prominent 
leaders of the colony and not submitted to the people, the Maryland Constitution
1 RFC 1:21,65-7.
2 With the constitution of 1776, Pennsylvania had replaced the governor with an Executive Council of 
twelve, who were elected directly by the people. In the other states the executive office was also weakened 
by the introduction of state councils. According to Gordon Wood, state councils “greatly diluted the 
independence of governors’ authority, making them... little more than chairman of their executive boards.” 
Wood, Creation, 137.
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provided that fifteen senators were chosen by forty electors, selected by the voters of the 
county in which they lived. Two electors were selected from each county, and the Cities 
of Annapolis and Baltimore were entitled to one each.
Letters exchanged between Edmund Pendleton and Thomas Jefferson after the 
introduction of Virginia’s Constitution show two points of view on the matter, one 
political, and the other practical, which many shared at Philadelphia. While admitting that 
his arguments would be “disagreeable to the people,” Pendleton wrote on August 10, 
1776, that he would not object to the election of the senators by the people, had they been 
given life term and “been chosen out of the people of great property,” that is, with “fixed 
Permanent property.” Jefferson agreed since he had already suggested the election of the 
upper house by the lower house, arguing: “A choice by the people themselves is not 
generally distinguished for its wisdom. This first secretion from them is usually crude and 
heterogeneous. But give to those so chosen by the people a second choice by themselves, 
and they generally will chuse wise men.” Similarly the case of the Electoral College in 
Maryland was in Madison’s eyes one of the best alternatives to an election of the 
executive by the legislature. One year after the closing of the Convention, in his 
observations on Jefferson’s draft of a constitution for Virginia, he wrote: “An election by 
the Legislature is liable to insuperable objections. It not only tends to faction intrigue and 
corruption, but leaves the Executive under the influence of an improper obligation to that 
department. An election by the people at large, as in this and several other States -  or by
3 RFC 1:77-78. According to Jackson Turner Main, this was the fulfillment of antidemocratic theories that 
many elite revolutionaries shared, but that were successful only in Maryland, where the upper class proved 
“sufficiently determined and powerful to create a truly aristocratic Senate.” Jackson Turner Main, The 
Upper House in Revolutionary America, 1763-1788 (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 204.
12
Electors as in the appointment of the Senate in Maryland, or indeed by the people through 
any other channel than their legislative representatives, seem to be far preferable.”4
Though the Electoral College per se did not meet any particular criticism when 
Wilson first proposed it on June 2, the attempt to strengthen the executive, by making it 
independent of the legislature, received scarce support. Instead, the Convention passed a 
resolution submitted by Randolph, which provided for an executive “to be chosen by the 
national legislature for the term of seven years,” and “to be ineligible a second time.” Of 
this initial balance between mode of election, terms of office, and eligibility for 
reelection, the seven-year term was the only aspect meant to grant a certain degree of 
autonomy to the executive. The Committee of the Whole confirmed Randolph’ provision, 
while also rejecting Delaware delegate John Dickinson’s proposal of an executive 
“removeable by the National Legislature on the request of a majority of the Legislatures 
of individual States,” a check on the national legislature which, on the other hand, would 
make the executive dependent on the states. However, despite the theatrical opposition of 
Randolph, “which he believed he should continue to feel as long as he lived,” and at least 
eleven other delegates who favored a plural executive, on June 4 the Committee approved 
Wilson’s provision for a unitary executive, hence laying the basis upon which the 
empowerment of the office would be grounded.5
On June 15 William Patterson of New Jersey submitted the New Jersey Plan,
4 Pendleton and Jefferson quoted in Main, Upper House, 204; Papers, 11:289.
5 RFC 1:85, 88. According to C. Herman Pritchett, “the unitary nature [was] the foundation on which the 
entire subsequent development of the Executive Office [rested].” C. Herman Pritchett, The Presidential 
Constitutional Position, in Thomas E. Cronin, ed., Rethinking the Presidency (Boston-Toronto, Little, 
Brown and Company, 1982), 122.
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which called for a “Federal Executive,” to be elected by “the U. States in Congress,” and 
to be “ineligible a second time, and removeable by Congress on application by a majority 
of the Executives of the several States.” The composition and the term of the office, 
which in the amended Virginia Plan constituted the strength of the executive, were not 
specified. Under the provisions of the New Jersey Plan, which involved only a partial 
reformation of the Articles of Confederation, the executive once again enjoyed little 
independence -  like in Dickinson’s proposal it depended on the states -  and therefore 
modest power. Against such a drawback Alexander Hamilton of New York raised his 
voice in his lengthy speech of June 18. Unmistakably rejecting the New Jersey Plan, but 
also substantially revising the Virginia Plan, he plainly called for a “general and national 
government, completely sovereign.” His plan arranged for a senate “to be elected by 
electors to be chosen for that purpose by the people, and to remain in office during life,” 
and provided that “all state laws” would be “absolutely void,” if they contravene those 
passed by the national legislature. As such, it aimed not only at the consolidation of the 
national government, but also at altering the balance of powers as it had evolved in most 
of the states. The strengthening of the executive, who would have the power, among 
others, “of negativing all laws,” and would be in office “during life,” was an essential 
aspect of this design. Like Wilson, Hamilton proposed that electors would be “appointed 
in each of the states to elect the executive.”6
While discussing the composition of the executive under the Virginia Plan, 
Sherman had said that he considered the Executive magistracy “as nothing more than an
6 RFC 1:244, 300.
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institution for carrying the will of the Legislature into effect,” and that “the person or 
persons ought to be appointed by and accountable to the Legislature only, which was the 
depositary of the supreme will of the Society.” His concept of the executive magistrate 
still resembled that which inspired the framers of state constitutions in 1776. For 
example, Jefferson in his 1776 draft for the Virginia Constitution conceived of a governor 
who had no voice in legislation, no authority in international relations, no authority to 
pardon crimes, and restricted power of appointment. Though the Virginia Constitution 
actually granted the governor greater powers, Jefferson mainly conceived of him as an 
“Administrator.”7
Cognizant of the weakness of the national executive in the Confederation, 
Hamilton held a completely different notion of its position in the constitutional 
framework. “Let one executive be appointed who dares execute his powers,” he urged his 
fellow delegates. He thus recognized the key role of the chief executive as a military 
leader and his broad responsibility in administration. He also acknowledged the 
executive’s function in unifying contrasting political views within the legislature as well 
as opposing sectionalism and what he considered shortsighted grievances, such as those 
from debtors and paper money champions, which were seen not only as economically 
detrimental but as a threat to the established social order. After all, he maintained that “all 
communities divide themselves into the few and the many. The first are the rich and well 
bom, the other the mass of the people.” As he would later explain in The Federalist, 
Hamilton believed that “energy in the Executive [was] a leading character in the
7 RFC 1:300. Jefferson quoted in Wood, Creation, 137.
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definition of good government,” and that “a vigorous Executive” was “essential to the 
protection of the community against foreign attacks... the steady administration of the 
laws... the protection of property against those irregular and high-handed combinations 
which sometimes interrupt the ordinary course of justice... the security of liberty against
o
the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of anarchy.”
Hamilton presented his proposals as amendments to the Virginia Plan, but the 
Convention never debated them. Uttered in an assembly where conservative statements 
were not rare, his speech was appreciated, but it was probably deemed impractical. A few 
days after Hamilton had intervened, William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut noted that 
the “gentleman from New York” had “been praised by every body,” but had “been 
supported by none.” And yet, even though the overall nationalistic and antidemocratic 
logic of his plan was substantially discarded, Hamilton’s proposals for the empowerment 
of the executive would eventually be influential. In the end the Convention would give 
the executive the power of “negativing all laws” passed by the legislature, even though 
two-thirds of the legislature could then void the presidential veto. The executive could 
also make treaties and appoint ambassadors and judges of the Supreme Court with the 
consent of the Senate, and act as “the sole direction of all military operations,” as 
Hamilton had recommended. Finally, the idea of an indirect presidential election 
eventually appeared in the proposal for the introduction of the Electoral College, which
8 RFC 1:65, 299. Publius, “The Federalist LXX,” New York Independent Journal, March 15, 1788, in 
DHRC, 16:396. In his exhortation to “[l]et one executive be appointed who dares execute his powers,” 
Hamilton was touching upon what Harvey C. Mansfield has defined as “the ambivalence of the executive 
power,” that is, its peculiarity of being “both subordinate and not subordinate, both weak and strong.” 
Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr., Taming the Prince: The Ambivalence o f Modern Executive Power (New York, 
The Free Press, 1989), xvi.
16
Hamilton actively supported when, after a long absence, he came back to Philadelphia 
toward the end of the Convention, and later, as “Publius,” in the struggle for the 
ratification of the Constitution. The thrust of Hamilton’s view was in its national 
perspective: a strong union needed a strong executive.9
In the four weeks between Hamilton’s speech and the adoption, on July 16, of the 
Connecticut Compromise, the issue of presidential selection was in practice set aside. It 
came up again only once the former supporters of the Virginia and the New Jersey plans 
had reached a basic agreement on the crucial subject of representation in the national 
legislature. At this point, Randolph’s provision still ruled: with the Connecticut 
Compromise, the delegates had agreed that the president was to be elected by the 
legislature, to serve for seven years, and to be ineligible for a second term. This 
settlement did not last long, and the issue of the mode of electing the executive once 
again arose, in increasingly Hamiltonian terms. Once almost everyone had finally 
accepted the idea of the unitary executive, the necessity of an adjustment in the balance 
of powers in favor of the executive became apparent. From July 17 to July 26, several 
schemes were put forward, all somehow aimed at rendering the chief executive, now 
widely called “the president,” more independent of the legislature. As a result, the 
Convention turned its attention back to popular election, and the interconnected problems 
of eligibility and terms of office.
This time the discussion went into greater depth, with the delegates’ expressing
9 RFC 1: 300, 363. As Broadus Mitchell put it, a number of Hamilton’s proposals, “percolated through the 
discussions in the succeeding three months and won their way into the Constitution.” This was particularly 
true with respect to the executive power. Broadus Mitchell, Alexander Hamilton: Youth to Maturity, 1755- 
1788 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1957), 392.
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practical as well as political considerations of the feasibility of an election by the people. 
However the independence of the executive was not the only issue at stake. Now that 
representation in both houses had been defined, the delegates had clearer ideas about 
whom the president should represent, and conceived different modes of election to give 
more power to the states, or to the people. The delegates who favored popular election 
were primarily from the states with larger electorates, notably Pennsylvanians Morris and 
Wilson. Those who opposed popular election were from the states with smaller 
electorates, whether because of their size, or because they had large slave populations 
that would not be influential in the selection of the president. The Connecticut 
Compromise had solved the issue of representation in the national legislature. As a result, 
in this crucial second round of discussion, the idea of a scheme of presidential election 
that would reflect the balance of representation in the legislature finally appeared. Some 
of the proposals now presented actually anticipated the compromise that would be 
eventually reached with the introduction of the Electoral College.
Popular election was the first scheme debated. On July 17 Gouvemeur Morris, 
another delegate from Pennsylvania, advocated an energetic executive, which was not 
impeachable, was provided with ample powers of appointment, was elected by the 
people, and was re-eligible. In particular, Morris made so strong a case against 
ineligibility -  he contended that it “tended to destroy the great motive to good behavior, 
the hope of being rewarded by a re-appointment” -  that the clause was immediately 
removed from the text on which the Convention so far had agreed. But the acceptance of 
Morris’s argument implied the rejection of legislative election -  which he compared to
18
“the election of a pope by a conclave of cardinals” -  because re-eligibility alone would 
put the president in the hands of the legislature. To reestablish the independence of the 
executive, proposals were thus made for letting him remain in office “during good 
behavior.” But that was going too far, because no definite term limits meant not enough 
check on the executive, and the Convention rejected both proposals. And yet, once re­
eligibility had passed, popular election seemed indeed to be the only way to make the 
executive independent of the legislature. It was then reconsidered, two days later, when 
Morris called for an executive magistrate who should be “the guardian of the people,” 
against “Legislative tyranny.”10
At this point of the proceedings, two issues arose in the discussion. Those issues 
were distinct, but they both brought the delegates to the same conclusion and paved the 
way for the final scheme: indirect election, whether it involved the participation of the 
people, or not. On the one hand, many were concerned that popular election would be 
practically impossible and politically dangerous for their republican design. Rufus King 
and Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts were among those. Representing a populous state 
where the people already elected the governor, they had reasons to both support and 
oppose it. They were not prejudicially against a popular election in which their state 
would have the lion share, but their own experience with democratic politics warned 
them against the perils that, in their eyes, popular election entailed. King assured his 
colleagues that he was “much disposed to think that in [a national presidential election] 
the people at large would chuse wisely,” but he also saw “some difficulty arising from the
10 RFC 2:33, 52.
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improbability of a general concurrence of the people in favor of any one man.” The 
difficulties King was referring to were practical: in the absence of well-structured 
national parties and a modem press, whose rapid development starting from the 1790s 
none of the framers fully anticipated, it was indeed difficult that one single candidate 
would reach the majority. Like Wilson and Hamilton had done before him, King 
proposed that “electors chosen by the people for the purpose” would elect the president. 
To him, indirect election apparently was a way to create an electorate which would be 
most likely to cast a useful vote for a national candidate to the presidency.11
In a political environment in which, despite rising democratization, deference still 
regulated personal relations to a great extent, and enfranchisement was limited to around 
one sixth of the population, King apparently expected that voters would select 
presidential electors out of informed people, whether because of their higher social 
statues or their involvement in politics. But, of course, indirect election was not only a 
practical device to ensure that the result of presidential elections would be clear. It was 
also meant to keep the great mass of voters from directly electing the highest magistrate 
of the republic. Govemeur Morris advocated a presidential election “by the freeholders of 
the Country.” He admitted that “difficulties attend this mode,” but he also added that 
“they have been found superable in New York &. in Connecticut and would... be found 
so, in the case of an Executive for the United States.” Perhaps because, like many others 
at the Convention, he too relied on Washington’s fame, Morris was optimist about the 
feasibility of popular election. “If the people should elect,” he predicted, “they will never
11 RFC 2:55-56.
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fail to prefer some man of distinguished character, or services; some man, if he might so 
speak, of continental reputation.” Gerry, who spoke little after King, made clear that there 
were also critical political issues at stake.12
Gerry discarded popular election all together, even in the form of indirect election
proposed by King. “The popular mode of electing the chief Magistrate would certainly be
the worst of all,” he unambiguously stated. He made clear that he feared the appeal of
demagogues on the voters, who, he maintained, were “uninformed” and would be
“misled by a few designing men.” To support his position he had convincing reasons that
went back to Shays’s Rebellion of the year before, and the role the governor of
Massachusetts and the president of New Hampshire had played in suppressing it. Both
the governor and the president had not been reelected in their states in 1787, and now
Gerry warned the Convention against the popular election of the national executive: “If
he should be so elected and should do his duty, he will be turned out for it like Governor
1 ^Bowdom in Massachusetts and President Sullivan in New Hampshire.”
It was remarkable that two delegates from a state that, in terms of representation, 
would have been favored by popular election nevertheless opposed it, to the point that 
one of them had proposed a presidential election by the state executives. It was less 
surprising that the delegates from small states as well as those from the Southern states, 
where approximately one third of the population were disenfranchised slaves, were 
dissatisfied with popular election and favored indirect election. Patterson of New Jersey 
made the case for the small states, when he said that his ideas “nearly coincided” with
12 RFC, 2:29.
13 RFC 2:57.
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those of King, and then proposed that the president should be appointed “by Electors to 
be chosen by the States in a ratio that would allow one elector to the smallest and three to 
the largest States.” Madison, who spoke shortly after Patterson, made what would 
eventually result as the decisive point for the provision of electors.14
A fine student of constitutionalism, but also a delegate from a slave state and a 
slaveholder himself, Madison praised the virtues of popular election -  apparently during 
the discussion nobody but Gerry explicitly rejected it -  while at the same time indicating 
its risks, particularly with regard to the imbalance in representation between the states. 
Madison was still concerned that popular elections would excessively suffer from 
localism. “The people at large” were, in his opinion, “as likely as any that could be 
devised to produce an Executive Magistrate of distinguished Character,” but they 
“generally could only know and vote for some Citizen whose merits had rendered him an 
object of general attention and esteem.” However Madison also noticed another problem 
with popular election, one “of a serious nature”. “The right of suffrage was much more 
diffusive in the Northern than the Southern States,” he maintained, “and the latter could 
have no influence in the election on the score of the Negroes.” On the other hand, he 
found that indirect election through electors “obviated this difficulty and seemed on the 
whole to be liable to the fewest objections.”15
Gerry followed Madison’s lead and put forward his plan of indirect election. As a
14 RFC 2:56.
15 RFC 2:56-57. That slavery greatly mattered in the creation of the Electoral College is one of the 
arguments of Paul Finkelman in “Slavery and the Constitutional Convention: Making a Covenant with 
Death,” in Richard Beeman and Stephen Botein, eds., Beyond Confederation: Origins o f the Constitution 
and American National Identity (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), chapter VII.
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part of a complicated frame of government he had conceived, he proposed that the 
executive would be appointed “by Electors to be chosen by the State Executives.” The 
Convention did not even discuss Gerry’s plan, and he soon backed another plan of 
indirect election, this time by Oliver Ellsworth of Connecticut. Ellsworth proposed that 
the executive should be chosen by electors “appointed by the Legislatures of the States,” 
whose number would be apportioned in the following ratio: “one for each State not 
exceeding 100,000 inhabitants, two for each above 100,000 and not exceeding 300,000, 
and, three for each State exceeding 300,000.” Ellsworth’s scheme was not as palatable to 
some states as the Connecticut Compromise had been. A crucial state in supporting the 
consolidation of the national government, Virginia would not see its slaves counted, as 
they were under the three-fifth clause. Having a free population of c. 450,000, it would be 
as represented as would Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and New York, whose population 
ranged from 310,000 to 430,000. But Virginia also had a slave population of almost 
300,000 that would go completely unrepresented. By attenuating the principle of 
proportional representation, granting the state legislatures the power of choosing the 
electors of the president, while also securing the executive’s independence from the 
legislature, Ellsworth’s scheme nevertheless proposed a viable alternative to both 
congressional and popular election. As such, it resembled what would be the final scheme 
of the Electoral College.16
The Convention approved Ellsworth’s plan, but the time was not ripe for
16 RFC 2:57. Jack Rakove noted that Ellsworth’s scheme “briefly took on the aura of a panacea.” Rakove, 
Original Meanings, 259. According to Shlomo Slonim, “now the provision for choosing an executive was, 
in certain key features, approaching the ultimate form that would emerge from the convention.” Slonim, 
“Electoral College,” 44.
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agreement. Four days later, on July 24, when discussion of the adoption of electors 
resumed, it was soon clear that most delegates were still not convinced. Hugh Williamson 
of North Carolina contended that electors “would certainly not be men of the 1st nor even 
of the 2nd grade in the States,” because “these would all prefer a seat in the Legislatures.” 
Gerry, backed by King, replied that “the best men” would be honored to be electors, since 
“the election of the Executive Magistrate will be considered as of vast importance and 
will excite great earnestness.” Williamson’s argument proved convincing while Gerry’s 
did not. The Convention thus rejected Ellsworth’s plan and readopted election by the 
legislature, now proposed by William Houston of New Jersey. Williamson seconded 
Houston’s motion, while Pennsylvania (Wilson and Morris’s state), Massachusetts (King
1 7and Gerry’s), Connecticut and Virginia (Ellsworth and Madison’s) voted against it.
Apparently the concept o f indirect popular election through presidential electors 
had still not won the approval of enough delegates from slave and small states. And yet, 
again, states’ representation was not the only issue at stake. While arguing about the 
personal quality of presidential electors, both Williamson and Gerry were in fact 
confronting the new problem of political organization in a national republic within the 
boundaries of a political conception that, while rooted in tradition, had nevertheless been 
eroded, and would gradually become anachronistic in the following years and decades. 
They spoke as if the electors’ honor, that is, their capability of living up to their social 
status, or “grade,” would provide the only reliable guarantee that a suitable president 
could be elected. True, those who had national interests or were enough aware of state
17 RFC 2:99-101.
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and continental politics as to raise above a narrow perspective were most likely to come 
from the ranks of what was then called the “better sort.” But the electors’ status also 
promised that they could be trusted in another way: that, with their choice, they would 
not defy the social order some had started questioning during the Revolution.
In a time when deferential habits were still usual and hierarchically organized 
mass parties were still to come, the politically problematic popular choice of an 
independent national executive was to pass through the filter of indirect election. And 
Williamson and Gerry were by no means the only ones that shared such a traditional 
conception. As would soon become clear, most of the framers intended indirect election 
as something similar to a system of “virtual representation,” of the kind the American 
colonists had opposed while revolting against the British Parliament, rather than a 
modem system of political representation. They expected or, rather, they wished the 
popular vote to be similar to an act of trust as opposed to a real political mandate.
If those who agreed with Williamson might have still believed that popular 
election, even indirect popular election, would be impractical and politically dangerous, 
the rejection of Ellsworth’s plan still left the compelling point for an independent 
executive unanswered. As the Convention moved on to re-discuss the matter the next 
day, Ellsworth presented a second plan of indirect election. This time he proposed that 
the legislature appoint the president but, in case he stood for reelection, “Electors 
appointed by the Legislatures of the States for that purpose” would decide whether he 
would stay in his office for another term or not. This way, Ellsworth explained, “a 
deserving Magistrate may be reelected without making him dependent on the
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Legislature.”18
Gerry, too, presented a new plan of indirect election, which slightly altered the 
one he had presented a few days before. Once again he moved that the national executive 
would be appointed by the executives of the states, but this time he added: “with advice 
of their Councils, and when there are no Councils by Electors chosen by the 
Legislatures.” The Convention rejected Ellsworth’ plan and did not even discuss 
Gerry’s.19
Ellsworth and Gerry’s proposals may have been awkward attempts to reach a 
compromise on a different basis, but they also illustrate how election by the legislature 
was repeatedly contrasted at the Convention and how the idea of electors loomed 
throughout the proceedings, being presented in several shapes, until it finally passed in 
the form of the Electoral College. At this point, however, agreement was still far away. 
Madison, indeed, thought that the Convention had definitely discarded the idea of 
electors. “This mode however had been rejected so recently and by so great a majority 
that it probably would not be proposed anew,” he said. But he also did not see any 
alternative to direct popular election. Election by the legislature, he maintained, was 
“liable to insuperable objections.” Election by the state legislatures was not politically 
practicable, since it stood against the very purpose of the Constitutional Convention 
itself. “The Legislatures of the States,” he contended, “had betrayed a strong propensity 
to a variety of pernicious measures. One object of the National Legislature was to 
controul this propensity. One object of the National Executive, so far as it would have a
18 RFC 2:108-109.
19 RFC 2:109.
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negative on the laws, was to controul the National Legislature, so far as it might be 
infected with a similar propensity. Refer the appointment of the National Executive to the 
State Legislatures, and this controuling purpose may be defeated.” Madison thus favored 
popular election, which “with all its imperfections he liked... best.” There was, of course, 
the disadvantage at which it put the slave states and the small states. But for his part, “as 
an individual from the Southern States,” he assured them that he was willing “to make the 
sacrifice,” conceding that “local considerations must give way to the general interest.”20
There was also another problem Madison saw with popular election. He was not 
convinced that voters could overcome their localism, and feared they would give their 
vote only to candidates from their own state, hence failing to select a national candidate. 
But he was willing to strike a compromise on this. He therefore endorsed Morris’s 
proposal that each voter would elect two candidates, one of which would be from a state 
different from his own, although he was also concerned that “each Citizen after having 
given his vote for his favorite fellow Citizen would throw away his second on some 
obscure Citizen of another State, in order to ensure the object of his first choice.” Once 
applied to presidential electors rather than common voters, Morris’s provision would 
eventually become part of the final scheme of election. On July 25 the Convention 
rejected it, and on the next day they resumed discussion of congressional election, 
ineligibility, and the seven-year term, as originally provided for in Randolph’s proposal
7 1of June 2 and now reintroduced by George Mason of Virgima.
The second round of debate on the selection of the president, from July 17 to July
20 RFC, 2:109-111.
21 RFC 2:113-114, 121.
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26, had touched all the problems at stake: the independence of the executive; the 
relevance of direct and indirect popular vote and of congressional selection in terms of 
state representation; and the suitability o f both voters and appointed electors for selecting 
the president. The delegates discussed several provisions that would be eventually 
considered along with the introduction of the Electoral College: indirect popular election, 
non-proportional apportionment of the electors, and double selection -  by either the 
people or state elected bodies — of the presidential candidates. They painstakingly tried to 
set the right balance between mode of election, term of office, and re-eligibility, but they 
were not able to go beyond the scheme they had initially agreed on while discussing the 
Virginia Plan.
Later in July the matter went to the Committee of Detail, who had to decide how 
the houses would vote for president: if separately or jointly, if casting votes by single 
representative and senator or by state. In fact their task was to conceive a system that 
could save the independence of the president while somehow reflecting the balance of 
representation that had already been imbedded in the legislature with the Connecticut 
Compromise.
On August 6, the Committee of Detail reported to the Convention that they had 
not yet solved the matter. They had agreed on the unitary office -  there would be no 
further argument on that issue -  but they had left Randolph’s provision unchanged, 
without specifying the mode of election by the legislature. That day and the following the 
Convention discussed the matter, with no result. It would be taken up again on the 24th, 
only to be again postponed. Discussion resumed on the 31st, when the Convention finally
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referred the matter to the Committee on Unfinished Parts, which was charged with 
resolving all issues that had been postponed or not acted on. That was the last chance to 
reach an agreement. On September 4 the Committee on Unfinished Parts reported back to 
the Convention, and proposed the adoption of the Electoral College. There are no records 
left from the proceedings of the Committee, whose four days of work must have been 
intense, because they virtually ended three and a half months of debate on the election of 
the national executive. Only minor amendments to the Committee’s provision for 
presidential election were added afterwards. The plan submitted was ingenious, as it 
provided the answers to many of the questions raised until then. The Committee, presided 
over by New Jersey delegate David Brearly, had chosen a system of indirect election that 
secured the independence of the president, while reproducing the balance between 
popular and state representation guaranteed by the Connecticut Compromise. The system 
also met the expectation of those who had warned the Convention against the practical 
and political viability of popular election on the national scale, as presidential electors 
were more likely than common voters to make an informed choice.
That the Electoral College proved satisfying to state’s righters was a crucial 
aspect of the plan for the sake of its reception. Each state would appoint, “in such manner 
as its Legislature may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of Senators 
and members of the House of Representatives, to which the State may be entitled in the 
Legislature.” In terms of representation, the plan constituted an exact reproduction of 
Congress. Hence the Electoral College was in line with the Connecticut Compromise, 
upon which the delegates had long since agreed. The state legislatures were also at liberty
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to decide upon the mode of election of the presidential electors. Furthermore, in case of a
tie vote or if no candidate attained a majority, the presidential election would be decided
22by a majority vote in the Senate, where each state was equally represented.
The idea of a runoff election was not a novelty. It had existed in Massachusetts 
for the election of the Senate since 1780, and in a form very similar to the one the framers 
adopted. Each county chose its senator, but if no candidate reached the absolute majority, 
the lower house would ballot until they filled the undecided seats. It is likely that the 
framers expected a presidential runoff election to work in the same way. They probably 
assumed that, if  no candidates won the majority in the Electoral College, the selection 
made by the presidential electors would be considered just as an indication of candidates, 
from which the Senate should pick the one they favored.23
Mason predicted that the presidential election would end up in the Senate 
“nineteen times in twenty.” Baldwin, Wilson, and Gouvemeur Morris, were more 
confident in the choice of the presidential electors. But if a runoff election eventually 
took place, it would have probably altered the nature of presidential election. The 
provision of a runoff election in the Senate was a safety measure, because it granted that 
even a candidate with a plurality in the Electoral College would become a president of 
national character, as that individual would be ultimately chosen by at least a majority of 
the states. However a runoff election would make the presidential election a matter of
22 RFC 2:497.
23 According to Main, while selecting the state’s senators Massachusetts’s lower house “felt no obligation 
to name the candidate with the highest number of votes, but chose from the first two or three on the list, 
depending on the balance of political power.” The framers probably saw the runoff election in Congress 
likewise. Of course, if the framers wanted Congress to merely register the result of the Electoral College 
and appoint the candidate with a plurality of the electoral votes, why through a congressional runoff 
election? Main, Upper House, 164.
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state power, and would affect the separation and balance of power, because it would 
weaken the president’s independence from the Senate, the branch of Congress that would 
share with him substantial powers of appointment and the responsibility of foreign 
affairs.24
On the issues of representation and the separation of power was therefore centered 
the discussion that opened after the report of Brearly’s Committee. Williamson and 
Wilson, both from states -  North Carolina and Pennsylvania -  that would be influential in 
the Electoral College, offered amendments to the provisions for runoff election. 
Williamson proposed that the Senate’s choice was restrained at least to the two 
candidates with the highest number of votes. Wilson thought it might be better “to refer 
the eventual appointment to the Legislature than to the Senate, and to confine it to a 
smaller number than five of the Candidates.” The day after, September 5, the Convention 
was still discussing the problem when Mason, a delegate from Virginia, moved to strike 
down the suggestion of a runoff election. Williamson seconded Mason’s motion, which 
would have allowed a candidate with a simple plurality in the Electoral College to
o r
become president.
It is not easy to understand whether Mason and Williamson’s purpose was to 
safeguard the people’s will or to give their states a chance to play a larger role in the 
election of the president. Apparently Sherman referred to the latter when he reminded the 
opponents of a runoff election that “if the Small States had the advantage in the Senate’s
24 RFC 2:500. On the framers’ prediction about the likelihood of a runoff election in Congress, see the brief 
but thoughtful discussion in Slonim, “Electoral College,” 54, n. 44.
25 RFC 2:501.
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deciding among the five highest candidates, the Large States would have in fact the 
nomination of these candidates.” On this crucial point the Convention almost 
unanimously decided to support the compromise reached in the Brearly’s committee.
Even Wilson opposed Mason’s motion that was rejected by all of the states but 
Williamson’s North Carolina. Conversely the next day, September 6, the Convention 
substituted the House of Representatives for the Senate, as the branch of Congress that 
would select the president in a runoff election. The Convention also ensured that state 
power would remain influential, by providing that the House would vote “with Members
0 f \from each State having one vote”.
The provision for state-regulated presidential elections was a further concession to 
state’s righters. This provision did not discard popular election all together, but 
considerably limited its likelihood, since the state legislatures were free to avoid a risky 
popular election. But even in the states that would choose popular election of the electors, 
the choice of the people was meant to matter only to a very limited degree. The apparent 
aim of the Electoral College was in fact to create a political body that would be elected 
by the people, but independent from its will. The provision that the electors would meet 
“in their respective States” was meant to isolate them from any external influences.
Whether those influences would come from “factious” minorities or foreign agents -  
concerns about the possible intervention of European powers in a popular election of the 
president had been repeatedly expressed throughout the proceedings of the Convention -  
it was deemed unlikely that they could spread over the entire national territory, hence
26 RFC 2:512-13, 519.
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being determinant for the final outcome of the election. True, the electors could still 
suffer from the excesses of localism. Hence the provision that the electors would “vote by 
ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State 
with themselves.” This way the framers tried to assure that at least one of the candidates 
from each state, even the one who got fewer votes, would have a national character. 
Madison had already warned the Convention against the possibility that common voters 
could “throw away” their second vote. Even though the electors of the president were 
supposed to be more “informed,” to a certain extent Madison’s warning applied to them 
too. In fact the delegates hoped that under the system they had engineered it would be 
possible that the second-best man in all the states would be the president, or that, in case 
of a runoff election in the House, the choice could at least be made among notable 
candidates.27
The Electoral College thus solved several problems, and though it certainly was a 
sophisticated mechanism, its genius was its simplicity. Being an exact reproduction of 
Congress, it perfectly reflected the Connecticut Compromise in the apportionment of 
presidential electors among the several states, while at the same time securing the 
president’s independence. With the introduction of the Electoral College, the framers 
were also avoiding what they considered the practical as well as political shortcomings of 
popular election. As a result, the Electoral College met with the almost unanimous 
consent of the framers. They added only minor amendments to the text the Committee 
had submitted, before finally passing the whole provision on September 7. The
27 RFC 2:498. An illustration of the framers’ typical concerns about the possible intervention of European 
powers in a popular election of the president is in one of Madison’s intervention of July 25, RFC 2:109.
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substitution of the House for the Senate, as the branch of Congress that would select the 
president in case of a runoff election, was coupled by another amendment that further 
secured the election from “the great evil of cabal,” as Morris put it. The words “the 
election shall be on the same day throughout the United States” were thus added to the 
provision that the electors “shall meet in their respective States.” This way, the framers 
aimed at further isolating the electors from any external influence.
That the framers, with few exceptions, were satisfied with the final Electoral 
College is also revealed by testimony other than the records of the Philadelphia 
Convention. In The Federalist Hamilton wrote that at the Convention “the mode of 
appointment of the chief magistrate of the United States [had been] almost the only part 
of the system, of any consequence, which [had] escaped without severe censure, or which 
[had] received the slightest mark of approbation from its opponents.” Maybe Hamilton 
overstated his memory for the sake of political struggle. Maybe Abraham Baldwin did so 
as well fifteen years later, on December 1803, during a session of the U.S. Senate that 
was debating the adoption of the Twelfth Amendment. Baldwin had been one of 
Georgia’s five delegates at Philadelphia and he recalled how the Convention welcomed 
the proposal of the Electoral College: “The mode was perfectly novel, and therefore 
occasioned a pause, but when explained and fully considered was universally admired, 
and viewed as the most pleasing feature in the Constitution.” However there might be 
some truth in both Hamilton and Baldwin’s reminiscences.
28 RFC 2:519, 500, 518. According to Slonim, the Electoral College was “a special congress elected to 
choose a president, without the shortcomings of the real Congress.” Slonim, “Electoral College,” 52.
29 Publius, “The Federalist LXVIII,” New York Independent Journal, March 12, 1788, in DHRC, 16:376.
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The Electoral College was the answer to a complicated and long-debated set of 
problems, and it was an ingenious mechanism indeed. No wonder, then, that the assembly 
filled with a number of well-educated eighteenth-century rationalists was not only 
surprised by that last-minute solution, but also impressed by such a masterpiece of 
constitutional engineering.
RFC 3:403.
CHAPTER II
FEDERALISTS AND ANTI-FEDERALISTS DISCUSS THE PLAN
The proceedings of the Philadelphia Convention were kept secret throughout the 
almost four months the framers conceived and discussed the provisions of the new 
constitution. On September 17 the Convention adjourned for the last time and forwarded 
its report to the Continental Congress, recommending that the Constitution be sent to the 
states to be ratified by appropriately elected conventions. On September 20 the 
Continental Congress read the document and on the 28th, after a brief debate, it 
transmitted the draft to the states. Over the next months the states called the conventions 
for ratification while the Constitution started being discussed, supported, and criticized. It 
had finally entered the public sphere.
The debate on the ratification of the Constitution involved many disparate voices 
that dominated American politics at least until the Constitution was finally secured when 
the New York Convention voted for its ratification in late July, 1788. The many 
provisions of the proposed plan of government gave rise to a host of highly problematic 
predictions about their alleged consequences. However, because of the relevance of the 
changes in the federal government that the Constitution entailed as well as the extension 
of popular participation in the ratification process, the nature of the debate became a 
grand referendum on the state of American politics after more than a decade of 
revolutionary ferment. And while the contending arguments were national in character,
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within the borders of each state the outcome of ratification depended on many variables: 
to what extent joining the Union was advantageous for the state, social conditions and 
political partisanship, the degree of party organization, the relative openness of the press 
and democratization of society, and the timing of the decision.
A variety of either wishful or worried predictions were thus expressed by an array 
of notable personalities as well as obscure figures. An assortment of political languages 
was displayed in both the private sphere and the public arena, including the chambers of 
the state legislatures and conventions, where discussion was regulated by formal 
procedures, the growing and less manageable world of the press, and the public meetings 
of common citizens, where deferential habits could be easily put aside. Printed material 
was particularly rich and diverse, including the learned essays of The Federalist and The 
Federal Farmer series as well as pieces of pure propaganda, satires, and parodies.
That the ratification of the Constitution gave rise to such a cacophony makes 
historical interpretation harder but it is also a blessing. The records of the debate provide 
useful information for our understanding of the framers’ intentions, since most of them 
actively participated in the struggle for ratification, dwelling on the feature of the new 
plan of government and responding to several enquires about the reason why they had 
approved certain provisions while striking others down.
But most of all, though the lack of well-organized national parties does not allow 
one to draw straight lines between those pro or against ratification, the records of the 
debate still provide valuable evidence as to how the Constitution was understood, 
supported, and opposed by Americans of different culture and social status, and from
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different sections of the newborn nation.1
The major issues that informed the discussion at Philadelphia -  federalism, 
representation, the separation of powers and their balance in the federal government — 
were now debated in a way that reflected the compound political culture of Revolutionary 
America, while also mirroring sectional and interstate cleavages. Both the Federalists and 
that heterogeneous coalition that we call the Anti-Federalists were enmeshed in the 
contradictions of a traditional order strained by social tensions. And if the Federalists 
more coherently championed a modem concept of political representation, whereas many 
Anti-Federalists most likely were stuck to a chimerical idea of direct democracy, neither 
those who supported nor those who either strenuously opposed or simply criticized the 
Constitution were completely free from a traditional concept of government and society. 
Both the Federalists and the Anti-Federalists often called for a paramount and elusive 
common good, while at the same time advocating the legitimacy of private interests.
The political meaning of the struggle between nationalism and parochialism was 
complex in other ways too. By enlarging the size of electoral districts and extending 
terms of office, the Constitution was meant to dilute the character of representation at the 
federal level. National consolidation therefore entailed a conservative turn away from the
1 For a general account of the ratification debate, see Robert A. Rutland, The Ordeal o f the Constitution:
The Antifederalist and the Ratification Struggle o f1787-1788 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1966). For a discussion of the nature of the debate, see Rakove, Original Meanings, 15-18, 95-96, 130-142, 
and “The Structure of Politics at the Accession of George Washington,” in Beeman and Botein, eds., 
Beyond Confederation, 290-293.
2 On the Federalists and Anti-Federalists’ political culture, see Wood, Creation; Rakove, Original 
Meanings', Storing, What the Anti-Federalist Were For (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). On 
the composed nature of the Anti-Federalist coalition, see Saul Cornell, The Other Founders: Anti- 
Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in America, 1788-1828 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1999).
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radicalism of the Revolution and promised to curb the democratic accomplishments as 
well as populist excesses in many of the states. Commercial and financial interests as 
well as the improvement of the market economy were also at stake. Creditors and 
commercial-minded Americans were more likely to favor the adoption of the new 
constitution than debtors and rural denizens who were on the periphery of the market 
economy.3
Though with varying intensity, these lines of conflict cut across each state, both in 
the North and the South. Basically, those cleavages ran along the blurring line that 
separated the wealthier areas of ports and navigable streams from the poorer ones of the 
backcountry, the older and more urbanized Eastern regions from the less structured 
settlements that spread toward the Western frontier. And if the late pre-Revolutionary 
period witnessed a gradual democratization of the colonial governments, the Revolution 
opened unprecedented possibilities in the states for the representation of these conflicting 
interests, which were also intensified by the economic and financial distress that came 
along with the struggle for independence.
As political consciousness and mutual support emerged among the lesser classes 
who traditionally had been the ruled rather than the rulers, partisanship exacerbated and, 
particularly in Massachusetts, New York, and most of all Pennsylvania, party politics 
developed at the state level.
3 For the distinction between nationalists and parochialists see Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History 
of the United States during the Confederation, 1781-1789 (New York). Jensen interpreted the partisan 
politics of the Congress as a contest between centralists and parochialists over the kind of powers to be 
granted to the national governments. He viewed the parochialists as defenders of democratic 
accomplishments in the states and the centralists as conservatives who tried to control social and economic 
change through consolidation.
39
A major feature of consolidation was also the regulation of sectional and interstate 
relations. The thirteen states spread over a large area and formed a diverse coalition. ' 
Slavery constituted a major difference between Northern and Southern states, affecting 
culture, politics, and social structure, as did the relative newness of settlements. The size 
and geographical location of the states also mattered, particularly with regard to the 
access to Western lands. Landed states like Massachusetts, Connecticut, New York, 
Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia had extensive western claims, which landless 
states, led by Maryland, confronted. The situation in the West was also a matter of 
common concern. Indians and European powers, the persistence of separatist movements, 
and widespread defiance of state and federal officials by illegal settlers were a threat to 
both the expansion and the defense of the new nation as a whole. In the Continental 
Congress landed and landless states reached a decisive compromise on the Northwest 
Ordinance, which established Congress’s title to the western lands. The Ordinance was 
adopted on July 13, 1787, only a few days before the Philadelphia Convention agreed 
upon the Connecticut Compromise and the three-fifth clause. The Constitution, of which 
the Connecticut Compromise and the three-fifth clause were two cornerstones, promised 
to provide the foundation for national defense.4
The Ordinance and the Constitution virtually resolved the conflict between large 
and small states, which would not be a critical issue during the struggle for ratification. 
There was no serious debate in small states like Delaware, New Jersey, and Maryland,
4 On the importance of states’ size and geographical location in the debate on federalism see Rosemarie 
Zagarri, The Politics o f Size: Representation in the United States, 1776-1850 (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1987).
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nor in a weak state like Georgia, where the constant threat of Indian wars demanded 
protection from Congress to allow westward expansion. That the Constitution protected 
slavery and, at least until 1808, the slave trade was thus the main reason why Federalist 
slaveholders, who ran the state’s economy and dominated the state’s government, 
encountered limited opposition in South Carolina.
Yet the balance of power between the states and the federal government 
embedded in the Constitution continued to be seen as a major problem by those who still 
resisted consolidation and its effect on the states’ autonomy and, most of all, on the 
political situation in many areas of the Confederation. Opposition to the ratification of the 
Constitution coalesced particularly in those landed and more populated states that had 
strengthened their relative autonomy throughout the colonial period, and where social 
turmoil and political partisanship had increased over the course of the Revolution. In 
Pennsylvania ratification was influenced by the flush of enthusiasm that spread after the 
signing of the Constitution. The Constitutional Party -  the coalition of back-country 
Scotch-Irish Presbyterian farmers and Philadelphia artisan-radicals that had created the 
state’s constitution of 1776 and had run the state legislature for most of the Revolutionary 
period -  probably did not have enough time to organize into an effective opposition to the 
conservative, former-loyalist, and now-Federalists Republicans. But in Massachusetts, 
New Hampshire, Virginia, and New York, where ratification took much longer, the 
Constitution was warmly debated and closely contested between two evenly balanced 
parties. North Carolina and Rhode Island ratified the Constitution even later. Not 
ratifying it would have confined the two states to a disadvantageous and perhaps
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dangerous isolation from the other eleven that had already entered the Union.5
Federalism, representation, and the separation and balance of powers had been 
central to the framers’ definition of the national executive and its election. Those issues 
informed the discussion of the Electoral College during the ratification debate as well. 
Many Anti-Federalists criticized Article II of the Constitution, the one that defines the 
powers and election of the president. A major concern of virtually all Anti-Federalists 
was the power of Congress to determine the time and place of the presidential election. 
But their main objection was that the president had been given too much power and that 
he could have even become a king, because his power would not be sufficiently checked. 
Many thus criticized the length of the terms of office and its indefinite re-eligibility. And 
if almost nobody objected to the provision of a single executive, there were fears that the 
president and the Senate, who share extended power of appointment and major 
responsibility in foreign policy, would resemble the British king and privy council. 
Proposals were thus made that an independent council of appointment be created. 
Likewise those who criticized the Electoral College stressed the risk of a new monarchy 
and the establishment of a truly aristocratic regime. Some complained about indirect 
election that rendered the president, as Richard Henry Lee put it, “two removes from the 
people.” Mercy Otis Warren defined the Electoral College as “an aristocratic junto, who 
may easily combine in each State to place at the head of the Union the most convenient
5 For a general account of the ratification in the several states, see primarily Patrick T. Conley and John P. 
Kaminski, eds., The Constitution and the States: The Role o f the Original Thirteen in the Framing and 
Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Madison, Wis.: Madison House, 1988). But see also Michael Allen 
Gillespie and Michael Lienesch, eds., Ratifying the Constitution (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 
cl 989); Steven R. Boyd, The Constitution in State Politics: From the Calling o f the Constitutional 
Convention to the First Federal Elections (New York: Garland, 1990).
42
instrument for despotic sway.” Others considered the possibility that elections would 
invariably end up in Congress not only as a concession to the states but also as limitations 
on the representation of the people.6
Conversely, those who during the early 1780s had been willing to strengthen the 
continental government, were unhappy with the absence of an independent executive 
under the Articles of Confederation. Though they were probably not prepared as were the 
Federalists to concentrate so much authority in the hands of the president and though they 
suspected the Federalists’ intentions, some Anti-Federalists nevertheless recognized the 
need for a stronger executive office. Among them were influential Anti-Federalists like 
the author of the Letters from the Federal Farmer as well as prominent figures, such as 
Virginia’s Patrick Henry and George Mason, New York’s Governor George Clinton, and 
Massachusetts’s Elbridge Gerry. Gerry and Mason were two of the five delegates at the 
Philadelphia Convention who at the last minute refused to sign the Constitution. Yet they 
had mixed feelings about the Electoral College.
In fact finding a properly balanced system of presidential election, like the 
framers had laboriously done over the course of the Philadelphia Convention, was a 
difficult task, one that often resulted in proposals that were hard to justify within the 
given Constitutional framework. For example, one of the fourteen amendments 
Massachusetts Anti-Federalist “Agrippa” proposed as a condition to the adoption of the 
Constitution provided that “[t]he president shall be chosen annually and shall serve but 
one year, and shall be chosen successively from the different states, changing every
6 Richard Henry Lee to Edmund Randolph, October 16, 1787, DHRC 8:62. A Columbian Patriot, 
“Observation on the Constitution,” Boston, February, 1788, DHRC 281
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year.” With this constitutional amendment Agrippa was providing a coherent alternative 
to the Electoral College. The amendment, however, would have defeated the framers’ 
attempt to provide the president with the necessary dispatch, strength, and independence, 
while probably voiding the office of any significance but that of a politically irrelevant 
administrator. The Federalists had thus good arguments to champion the framer’s work, 
and that was particularly true with regard to the crucially important balance between 
states’ right and the authority of the federal government that had been accomplished with 
the creation of the Electoral College.7
That was one of the main subjects of the speech that James Wilson -  a major 
advocate for the strengthening of the executive office at the Philadelphia Convention -  
delivered in the State House Yard of Philadelphia, on October 6. Held less than three 
weeks after the closing of the Convention, Wilson’s speech opened the Federalists’ 
campaign for ratification in Pennsylvania. Wilson’s argument that the Constitution made 
the presidential election the domain of the state legislatures was simple and effective: 
“The president is to be chosen by electors, nominated in such manner as the legislature of 
each state may direct,” he maintained, “so that if there is no legislature, there can be no 
electors, and consequently the office of president cannot be supplied.” The speech was 
immediately published and then widely reprinted at the national level. Wilson repeatedly 
made his case about the federal character of the presidential elections in newspapers and 
as a delegate at the Pennsylvania Convention. His straightforward argument represented 
the Federalists’ typical understanding of federalism, and was particularly influential over
7 Agrippa XVI, Massachusetts Gazette, February 5, 1788, DHRC 5:866.
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the course of the ratification debate.8
In a letter where he explained the features of the new Constitution to Jefferson, 
Madison, like Wilson, stressed that “[t]he general authority will be derived entirely from 
the subordinate authorities,” and that the president “derives his appointment from the 
States, and is periodically accountable to them.” Writing a few month later as “Publius” 
in the New York Independent Journal, he likewise maintained that “[t]he State 
Governments may be regarded as constituent and essential parts of the federal 
Government; whilst the latter is nowise essential to the operation of the former. Without 
the intervention of the State Legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be 
elected at all.”9
Later in the ratification process, the same argument echoed in a speech by 
Federalist James Iredell at the North Carolina Convention. Noting that “[t]he very 
existence of the general government depends on that of the State governments,” Iredell 
argued that each branch of the federal government, including the presidency, depended 
directly on the states. “The State legislatures are to choose the senators. Without a Senate 
there can be no Congress. The State legislatures are also to direct the manner of choosing 
the president. Unless, therefore, there are State legislatures to direct that manner, no 
president can be chosen. The same observation may be made as to the House of 
Representatives, since, as they are to be chosen by the Electors of the most numerous
8 James Wilson, Speech in the State House Yard, Philadelphia, October 6, 1787, DHRC 2:170. According 
to the editors of the DHRC, Wilson’s became “the ‘official’ Federalist interpretation of the Constitution 
throughout the United States.” DHRC 2:128.
9 James Iredell, Speech at the North Carolina Convention, July 25, 1788, in DSSC 3:53. For an articulate 
statement of the same argument by Wilson, see also his speech at the Pennsylvania Convention of 
November 28, 1787, DHRC 2:401-404.
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branch of each State legislature, if there are no State legislatures, there are no persons to 
choose the House of Representatives.”10
According to Federalist John Dickinson, who had been one of the authors of the 
Connecticut Compromise at the Philadelphia Convention, the states had been given “the 
fairest, freest opening” regarding the presidential election. But many Anti-Federalists did 
not share the Federalists’ conception of federalism. Most Anti-Federalists criticized the 
Federalists’ idea of representation and sovereignty, which they evidently considered too 
abstract, if not deceptive. Arthur Lee, an elite Anti-Federalist from New York writing as 
“Cincinnatus,” rejected the idea that “[bjecause the state legislatures must nominate the 
electors of the President once in four years... therefore they will continue to be 
sovereign,” and that “[sovereignty then consists in electing the members of a 
sovereignty.” Lee explicitly attacked Wilson: “Did you think, Sir, that you was [sic] 
speaking to men or to children, when you hazarded such futile observations?” Similarly, 
Samuel Bryan, the radical Anti-Federalist who authored the widely circulated and quite 
influential essays known as “Centinel,” challenged Wilson’s argument that “the existence 
of the proposed federal plan depends on the existence of the State governments, as the 
senators are to be appointed by the several legislatures, who are also to nominate the 
electors who chuse the President of the United States; and that hence all fears of the 
several States being melted down into one empire, are groundless and imaginary.” Bryan 
asked: “Who is so dull, as not to comprehend, that the semblance and forms of an ancient 
establishment, may remain after the reality is gone?” Rejecting what he considered
10 James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, October 24, 1787, DHRC 13:445. Publius, “The Federalist XLV,” 
New York Independent Journal, January 26, 1788, DHRC 15:478.
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Wilson’s formalism, Bryan was concerned that the state legislatures would “dwindle into 
mere boards of appointment.” A skeptical Samuel Osgood was likewise concerned about 
Congress and their power “of making or altering the Times & Manner” of choosing the 
presidential electors. “How far the Word ‘Manner’ extends I know not,” he confided to 
Samuel Adams. But it was clear to him that the existence of the State Legislature was 
“not necessary for the purpose of choosing Electors,” and that it was “not fit that a Board 
of Electors Should be called a Legislature.”11
Lee, Bryan, and Osgood’s remarks reflected the understandable uncertainties on 
the actual functioning of the Electoral College, that sometimes gave rise to untenable 
predictions about the possible encroachment of the federal government on the state 
governments. Though the Constitution reserved ample power to the state legislatures, in 
most of the states Anti-Federalists of any provenance were still afraid that Congress 
would manage to exclude the state legislatures from the regulation of federal elections 
and even curb the people’s right to vote. Robert Whitehill, a delegate at the Pennsylvania 
Convention from Cumberland County, a western stronghold of Pennsylvania Anti- 
Federalists, found it “improper” that Congress had the power to fix the time of choosing 
the presidential electors. “We have no power to oblige Congress to act,” he maintained. 
Massachusetts Anti-Federalist “Samuel” argued that Congress may make the president 
“perpetual,” and that even the president may make himself so: “For the Congress are to 
appoint the time, and place of choosing the electors, and of their giving their votes, the
11 Fabius II (John Dickinson), Pennsylvania Mercury, April 15, 1787, DHRC 17:124. Cincinnatus V, “To 
James Wilson, Esquire,” New York Journal, November 29, 1787, DHRC 14:307. Centinel II, Philadelphia 
Freeman’s Journal, October 24, 1787, DHRC 13:459. Centinel V, Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, 
December 4, 1787, DHRC 14:347. Samuel Osgood to Samuel Adams, January 5, 1788, DHRC 15:265-266.
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President may so far negative it, as that there must be two thirds of both Houses to make 
it valid; and the standing army they may keep in time of peace, they may canton where 
they please, to suppress any complaints that may arise by oppression, or loss of rights or 
privileges.” Patrick Henry warned the Virginia Convention that the “controul given to 
Congress over the time, place, and manner of holding elections, will totally destroy the 
end of suffrage.” In New York “The Federal Farmer” was likewise concerned that
19Congress would not make any provision for election and would eventually cancel them.
Even after their state had already ratified the Constitution, a group of 
Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists, including Whitehall, published “The Dissent of the 
Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention.” Their grim prediction was that, “as Congress 
have the control over the time of the appointment of the president general, o f the senators 
and of the representatives of the United States, they may prolong their existence in office, 
for life, by postponing the time of their election and appointment, from period to period, 
under various pretences, such as an apprehension of invasion, the factious disposition of 
the people, or any other plausible pretence that the occasion may suggest... when the 
spirit of the people shall be gradually broken; when the general government shall be 
firmly established, and when a numerous standing army shall render opposition vain, the 
Congress may compleat the system of despotism, in renouncing all dependence on the 
people, by continuing themselves, and children in the government.” “A Georgian” 
proposed a constitutional amendment to “fix the day unalterably forever for choosing
12 Samuel, Independent Chronicle, 10 January 1788, DHRC 5:680. Patrick Henry, Speech at the Virginia 
Ratifying Convention, June 5, 1788, DHRC 9:964. Robert Whitehill, Speech at the Pennsylvania 
Convention, December 7, 1787, DHRC 2:512. “Letter from the Federal Farmer XIV,” in CAF 2.8.181.
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Electors, and for them to give their votes for a President,” but he found little support for
the idea. However amendments providing for no federal interference into election laws,
unless a state failed to provide for election, were proposed by the conventions of
Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, New York,
1 ^North Carolina, and Rhode Island. These amendments were similarly not adopted.
Less controversial was the provision for the runoff election in Congress. That 
concession to state righters derived, as Pennsylvania Federalists Tench Coxe put it, “from 
a due attention to [the states’] sovereignty in appointing the ostensible head of the foederal 
government.” Therefore most Anti-Federalist did not argue about it. Only the so-called 
“Society of Western Gentlemen,” from Kentucky, proposed a constitutional amendment 
providing that, in case of a runoff election in the House, representatives would vote 
“individually,” and that a quorum for that purpose would consist of “a Member or 
Members from two thirds of the states.” The intention of the “Gentlemen” was perhaps 
that of allowing Kentucky, at that time still a territory within the borders of Virginia, to 
play an independent role in the election of the president. This proposal never received 
serious discussion.14
The constitutional provision for the runoff election was nothing more than a
13 “The Dissent of the Minority of the Pennsylvania Convention,” Pennsylvania Packet, December 18,
1787, DHRC 15:23-24; A Georgian, Gazette of the State of Georgia, November 15, 1787, DHRC 3:241. 
For information about the proposed amendment, see Murray Dry, “The Case Against Ratification: Anti- 
Federalist Constitutional Thought,” in Leonard Levy and Dennis Mahoney, eds., The Constitution: A 
History o f its Framing and Ratification (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1987) p. 288.
14 A Freeman II, Pennsylvania Gazette, January 30, 1788, DHRC 15:510. “The Society of Western 
Gentlemen Revise the Constitution,” Virginia Independent Chronicle, April 30, 1788, DHRC 771, 777. The 
“Western Gentlemen” were not the only ones in Kentucky 4o criticize the apportionment of representation 
in the Electoral College and the provision for the runoff election in the House. Republicus warned his 
readers that “the sacred rights of mankind” would “dwindle down to Electors of Electors, and those again 
Electors of other Electors.” Republicus, Kentucky Gazette, March 1, 1788, DHRC 8:448.
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safety valve in case no candidate reached a majority in the Electoral College. That was 
not likely to happen when one of the candidates was a George Washington. But when the 
celebrated general would no longer be politically active, a runoff election was still 
considered, as Hamilton put in The Federalist, “a case which it cannot be doubted will 
sometimes, if not frequently, happen.” That was part of the framers’ intention to regulate 
the presidential election, in a way that guaranteed the federal character of the winning 
candidate, while also securing the election from the reach of factious minorities. In other 
words, the provision touched upon the major problems of partisanship and popular 
representation in an extended republic. And those turned out to be the most divisive issue 
not only between Federalists and Anti-Federalists, but also among Anti-Federalists, when 
they discussed the Electoral College. The debate on the Electoral College in states such 
as Pennsyilvania, Massachusetts, Virginia, and New York sheds light on the social and 
political character of the struggle between Federalists and Anti-Federalists as well as the 
composite nature of Anti-Federalism. In particular, it demonstrated the division that 
existed among elite, middling, and plebeian Anti-Federalists, with respect to the critical 
issues of partisanship and representation.15
Central to the Anti-Federalists’ conception of representation was the praise of the 
virtues of the small republic and the consequent rebuttal of the Federalists’ plan of the 
extended republic. As one historian noted with regard to the Anti-Federalist position,
15 Publius, “The Federalist LXVI,” New York Independent Journal, March 8, 1788, DHRC 16:356.
On the diversity of the Anti-Federalist coalition, that reflected “inchoate class divisions in America,” and 
their attempt to unite through the growing world of print, that provided them with “a shared language and 
common set of criticisms,” see Cornell, Other Founders, particularly Chapter I. Quotations are from pages 
28,48.
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“[b]ehind the administrative defects of a large republic lie three fundamental 
considerations, bearing on the kind of government needed in a free society. Only a small 
republic can enjoy a voluntary attachment of the people to the government and a 
voluntary obedience to the laws. Only a small republic can secure a genuine 
responsibility of the government to the people. Only a small republic can form the kind of 
citizens who will maintain republican government.” Yet the reasons why Anti-Federalists 
advocated small size republics seem more complex. Elite Anti-Federalist, particularly 
from small states, often considered the limited extent of a republic as a means of social 
control, whereas in large states a republican government was likely to be strained by 
internal social tension. It was probably with this in mind that Luther Martin, a Maryland 
delegate to the Constitutional Convention and a leading Anti-Federalist in the Maryland 
Ratifying Convention, told his fellow delegates at Philadelphia that “the States that please 
to call themselves large, are the weakest in the Union.” Conversely, popular Anti- 
Federalists, for example those from a large states like Pennsylvania, where partisanship 
and popular participation had increased over the course of the Revolution, advocated 
states’ rights in order to support popular representation, and feared that the establishment 
of a strong federal government would curb the democratic tendencies in their states. A 
plebeian Anti-Federalists from Pennsylvania, such as Centinel, embraced a class­
conscious and radically localist ideology that was far from the aristocratic stance of elite 
Anti-Federalists, such as Virginian Patrick Henry or Marylander Luther Martin.16
16 Storing, Anti-Federalists, 16. RFC 2:4. For Centinel’s constitutional thought, see in particular Centinel I, 
Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, October 5, 1787, DHRC 1:159-165.
The consideration of the composite nature of the Anti-Federalists is necessary for a comprehensive
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In Pennsylvania the debate on ratification started right after the closing of the 
Philadelphia Convention. On September 29 the Pennsylvania legislature called for a state 
ratifying convention. With a few exceptions, Republicans were Federalists and 
Constitutionalists were Anti-Federalists. From the outset of the debate, the Federalists 
carefully stressed the “popular” character of the presidential election. Tench Coxe, a 
Federalist from the eastern county of Lancaster, championed the Electoral College in a 
series of widely circulated essays, which he published under the pseudonyms of “An 
American Citizen” and “A Democratic Federalist.” If Wilson, in his speech of October 6, 
had stated that the presidential election was the domain of the state legislatures, Coxe 
now maintained that the people were, under the proposed constitution, “the fountain o f  
power and public honor” This applied to all branches of government, including the 
presidency: “The President, the Senate, and House of Representatives, will be the 
channels through which the stream will flow -  but it will from the people, and from them 
only. Eveiy office, religious, civil and military, will be either their immediate gift, or it
evaluation of their constitutional thought. Storing’s contention that Anti-Federalists saw “the chief danger 
as the inherently aristocratic character of any government” may be misleading, because there were 
aristocrats sharing a traditional view of society in both coalitions. Likewise Wood’s idea that the quarrel 
between Federalists and Anti-Federalists “was fundamentally one between aristocracy and democracy” 
seems partial. Cornell’s perspective seems more balanced. To elite Anti-Federalists, Cornell maintained, “a 
proper measure of democracy was necessaiy for rulers to enjoy the confidence o f the people,” and the 
Constitution “threatened this distinctive vision of localism, because it would no longer be possible to 
reconcile natural aristocracy with democracy.” On the other hand, “popular Anti-Federalism asserted the 
superiority of democracy and vigorously defended egalitarian ideals.” Cornell’ pluralist perspective allows 
one to grasp the diversity of Anti-Federalism and to go beyond Main’s more limited distinction between 
“well-to-do thinkers, most frequently from the agricultural interests,” and “small property holder.” 
According to Cornell, “[pjopular opposition to the Constitution brought together a diverse coalition that 
included members of the middling sort as well as plebeian farmers and artisan. The most influential 
spokesmen for middling ideas were the new political men who dominated state politics in places like New 
York and Pennsylvania.” Storing, Anti-Federalists, 48; Wood, Creation, 485; Cornell, Other Founders, 80- 
82; Main, The Antifederalists: Critics o f the Constitution, 1781-1788 (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1961), xi.
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will come from them through the hands of their servants”11
On the other fence of the political struggle, Centinel held a much different 
concept of the presidency. In an inflamed essay in which he attacked the “wealthy and 
ambitious, who in every community think they have a right to lord it over their fellow 
creatures,” he rejected John Adams’s concept of mixed government as “chimerical,” 
because “different orders in government will not produce the good of the whole,” and 
dismissed the proposed plan of government as an “attempt to establish a despotic 
aristocracy among freemen,” Centinel warned his readers against the cumulating powers 
in the president and the Senate. The president, he contended, “would be a mere pageant 
of state, unless he coincides with the views of the Senate, would either become the head 
of the aristocratic junto in that body, or its minion.” And “from his power of granting 
pardons, he might skreen [sic] from punishment the most treasonable attempts on 
liberties of the people.” An Old Whig considered the president as powerful as a king, but 
what he found most dangerous was that the president would be a king “of the worst kind; 
an elective King.” An Old Whig believed that an election for such a powerful office 
would be “a scene of horror and confusion.” In fact he had the same concern that the 
Federalists had about the political feasibility of the presidential election, but he did not 
think the Electoral College to be the solution. According to An Old Whig, the office of 
the president should have been “either reduced to a lower pitch or made perpetual and
17 An American Citizen IV, “On the Federal Government, Philadelphia,” October 21, 1787, DHRC 2:432 
But see also An American Citizen I, “On the Federal Government,” Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, 
September 26, 1787, DHRC 2:142. An American Citizen II, “On the Federal Government,” Philadelphia 
Independent Gazetteer, September 28, 1787, DHRC 2:143), and A Democratic Federalist, Independent 
Gazetteer, November 16, 1787, DHRC 2:297.
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hereditary.”18
At the state convention that opened on November 20 Wilson was, again, an 
eloquent advocate of the proposed constitution. He articulated the Federalists’ idea of the 
president as a national figure above factious partisanship. He praised the provision of the 
presidential veto over Congress, as a measure “for the security and happiness of the 
people of the United States.” He believed that the president had to be a paternal figure, 
and that the provision of the Electoral College served the purpose. The president, Wilson 
contended, “will be chosen in such a manner that he may be justly styled THE MAN OF 
THE PEOPLE; being elected by the different parts of the United States, he will consider 
himself as not particularly interested for any one of them, but will watch over the whole 
with paternal care and affection.” And if Centinel warned against the perils of 
aristocracy, Wilson favored the Electoral College because “[ujnder this regulation, it will 
not be easy to corrupt the electors, and there will be little time or opportunity for tumult 
or intrigue.” The presidential election, he maintained, “will not be like the elections of a 
Polish diet, begun in noise and ending in bloodshed.”19
After Pennsylvania had ratified the Constitution, Anti-Federalists continued to 
campaign for amendments. The 23 delegates that had voted against ratification issued 
“The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania 
To Their Constituents.” They did not share the Federalists’ conviction that the will of the 
electorate would be refined and achieved through the creation of the Electoral College.
18 Centinel I, Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, October 5, 1787, DHRC 1:159-165. An Old Whig VI, 
Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, November 24, 1787, CAF 3.3.31.
19 James Wilson, Speech at the Pennsylvania Convention, December 1, 1787, DHRC 2:452; Speech at the 
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, December 11, 1787, DHRC 2:566-567.
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To the contrary, they were concerned that, under the new constitution, “men of the most 
elevated rank in life, will alone be chosen,” and that “[t]he other orders in society, such as 
farmers, traders, and mechanics, who all ought to have a competent number of their best 
informed men in the legislature, will be totally unrepresented.” Philadelphiensis 
published new warnings against the perils of an “elective king.” To this charge John 
Dickinson responded: “This president is to be chosen, not by the people at large, because 
it may not be possible, that all the freemen of the empire should always have the 
necessary information, for directing the choice of such an officer; nor by Congress, lest it 
should disturb the national councils; nor BY ANY ONE b o d y  w h a t e v e r , for fear o f undue 
influence.” What Dickinson meant by “undue influence” was mobocracy, because 
“[w]hen frensy [sic] seizes the mass, it would be madness to think of their happiness, that 
is, of their freedom. They will infallibly have a Philip or a Ccesar, to bleed them into
90soberness of mind.”
Words like Dickinson’s resonated in the chamber of the Massachusetts Ratifying 
Convention, where Fisher Ames maintained that “ [fjaction and enthusiasm are the 
instruments by which popular governments are destroyed.” Ames was a leading 
Federalist and a member of the so-called “Essex Junto,” an elitist group of propertied 
conservatives from Essex County, in the Northern part of the state. To Ames, democracy 
was “a volcano, which conceals the fiery materials of its own destruction.” But William
20 “The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of Pennsylvania To Their 
Constituents,” Pennsylvania Packet and Daily Advertiser, December 18, 1787, CAF 3.11.35. 
Philadelphiensis XII, Philadelphia Freeman’s Journal, April 9, 1788, 17:62. But see also Philadelphiensis
IX, X, XI, DHRC 16:57-58, 159, 366. Fabius II, Pennsylvania Mercury, 15 April, 17:121. Fabius IV, 
Pennsylvania Mercury, April 19, 1788, DHRC 17:182.
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Symmes, an elite Anti-Federalist also from Essex County, considered faction “the vehicle 
of all transactions in publick bodies,” and claimed to be “rather surprised” to see that 
other gentlemen that “know this so well” were “so sanguine in this respect.” Faction was 
a controversial issue in a state that had long clung to the ideal of a cooperative society but 
had been recently strained by the tension between commerce and community. To Anti-
Federalist Benjamin Austin, Jr., a leader of the Boston mob close to Samuel Adams, and
/
a delegate to the state convention, presidential electors could indeed be a faction. Writing 
as “Candidus,” he contended that the “choice of President by a detached body of electors
91was dangerous and tending to bribery.”
Virginia delegates that convened in their state convention between the 2nd and the 
27th of June, 1788, were equally preoccupied with the influence of faction in the 
presidential election. Both Federalists and Anti-Federalists Virginians expressed alleged 
concerns about the problem of partisanship. Most Federalists probably agreed with 
Francis Corbin, who found that the “evils” of “faction, dissension, and consequent 
subjection of the minority, to the caprice and arbitrary decisions of the majority, who 
instead of consulting the interest of the whole community collectively, attend sometimes 
to partial and local advantages,” would be “avoided by this Constitution.” Anti-Federalist 
leaders thought the opposite. James Monroe did not trust Congress, for its power to fix 
the time of choosing the presidential electors and the president. He asked the Convention: 
“Is it not presumable they will appoint the times of choosing the Electors, and electing
21 Fisher Ames, Speech at the Massachusetts Convention, January 15, 1788, DHRC 6:1192. William 
Symmes, Speech at the Massachusetts Convention, 22 January, 1788, DHRC 6:1309. Candidus I, 
Independent Chronicle, December 6, 1787, DHRC 4:395.
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the president, at a considerable distance from each other, so as to give an opportunity to 
the Electors to form a combination?” Monroe also predicted that a number of presidential 
electors might have prevented the election of a candidate they disliked, by throwing the 
election into Congress. The president would have thus depended on a majority of the 
states. And if that was the case, William Grayson glossed, “the seven Eastern States” 
would take hold of the presidential election, so that the federal government would have 
been a “government of a faction.” Apparently the issue of popular participation in the 
presidential election did not concerned these elite Anti-Federalists, who focused instead
99on the representation of the states.
A concern similar to Monroe’s was expressed by “The Federal Farmer,” who 
probably was New York middling Anti-Federalist Melancton Smith. The Federal Farmer 
was against “a feeble executive,” and admitted that the constitutional provision for the 
presidential election was the result of “a judicious combination of principles and 
precautions.” He found that, if the number of presidential electors were increased, “the 
system would be improved,” yet he did not consider the democratic character “so 
important in the choice of the electors as in the choice of representatives,” because the 
president will be anyway “one of the very few of the most elevated characters.” But what 
he found truly dangerous was “that a majority of a small number of electors may be 
corrupted and influenced, after appointed electors, and before they give their votes, 
especially if a considerable space of time elapse between the appointment and voting.”
22 Francis Corbin, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 6, 1788, DHRC 9:1010. James 
Monroe, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 18, 1788, DHRC 10:1371. William Grayson, 
Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 18, 1788, DHRC, 10:1374.
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On the other hand, Hamilton, who confronted Smith in the New York Ratifying 
Convention and wrote probably the most cogent defense of the Electoral College by a 
Federalist, contended that the presidential election would be guarded against “cabal, 
intrigue and corruption,” the “most deadly adversaries of republican government.” 
Hamilton’s take on the problem of faction, while judicious, was less nuanced than the one 
Madison had expressed a few months before in “The Federalist X.”23
Rhetorical skirmishes were not absent in the discussion about faction among 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists: each side tended to ascribe factious motives to the other, 
for the sake of their own position. But the problem of faction, partisanship, and party 
politics remained controversial throughout the debate on ratification. True, a Federalist 
like Madison was beginning to articulate a modem, pluralist concept of party-politics, 
while an Anti-Federalist like Symmes stated what was probably clear to many, when he 
referred to the inevitability of factions as “the vehicle of all transactions in publick 
bodies.” Yet both coalitions were for the most part composed by men who, as one 
historian put it, “looked upon parties as sores on the body public.” If most Federalists still 
held a classical concept of society, which was organic, hierarchical, and genuinely elitist 
in its character, many Anti-Federalists pursued the equally traditional concept of the 
small, homogeneous, and participatory community of yeoman farmers. Party politics had 
gradually developed throughout the late colonial and revolutionary periods at both state
23 The Federal Farmer, “An Additional Number of Letters to the Republican,” New York, May 2, 1788, 
DHRC 17: 325, 327. Publius, “The Federalist LXVIII,” New York Independent Journal, March 12, 1788, 
DHRC 16:377. The identity of “The Federal Farmer” has long been controversial, and it is still not certain. 
However I found Cornell’s contention that The Federal Farmer was Melancton Smith convincing. See 
Cornell, Other Founders, 89.
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and national level, and the debate on the ratification of the Constitution further promoted 
political polarization. In the decade immediately following the ratification of the 
Constitution, a still inchoate party system rapidly articulated, hence changing the nature 
of presidential elections, which became intensely politicized. The beginnings of this 
politicization were already apparent in the first federal elections of 1788-1790.24
24 The historian cited is Richard Hofstadter. The quotation is from Richard Hofstadter, The Idea of a Party 
System: The Rise of Legitimate Opposition in the United States 1780-1840 (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1969), 2.
CHAPTER III
THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN THE FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS
None of the ten amendments in the Bill of Rights fundamentally altered either the 
structure of the federal government or the regulation of the federal elections. The 
carefully crafted mechanism of the presidential election, with its many implications with 
regard to federalism, representation, and the separation of power, was probably the 
constitutional provision least likely to be altered. Madison was right when he reminded 
his fellow delegates of the Virginia Ratifying Convention that “[i]t was found difficult in 
the Convention, and will be found so by any Gentleman who will take the liberty of 
delineating a mode of electing the President that would exclude those inconveniences 
which they apprehend.” During the ratification debate the Federalists’ plan for the 
presidential election was never seriously challenged. The Anti-Federalists who criticized 
it were often unable to provide any viable alternative.1
1 James Madison, Speech at the Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 18, 1788, DHRC 10:1377. According 
to Main, while the office of the president came under attack, “the major criticism was not directed at the 
mode of his election nor his term of office. Less than a dozen of Antifederalists writers registered a protest 
against the Electoral ... the vast majority of critics did not even mention the subject. Probably this was so 
because no substitute seemed any more acceptable. Direct election would be a national rather than a federal 
feature (as was understood in the Philadelphia Convention), while election by the legislature was no more 
democratic than by the Electoral College.” Main, Antifederalists, 140. The validity of Main’s observation 
could be indirectly suggested by a remark by Wilson about Anti-Federalist critiques of presidential indirect 
election. In a speech at the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention Wilson asked his opponents: “if gentlemen 
object that an eighth part of our country forms a district too large for election, how much more would they 
object, if it was extended to the whole Union?” James Wilson, Speech at the Pennsylvania Ratifying 
Convention, 11 December 1787, DHRC 2:567. However there is no evidence that the Anti-Federalist 
opposed popular election for its federal character.
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Still, the actual functioning of the Electoral College was, at least in part, 
indefinite, to the extent that nobody knew for certain what system each state legislature 
would choose for the selection of the presidential electors. Federalist Tench Coxe praised 
the Electoral College, since the “[t]he people at large in each state... may choose the 
electors of the President and Vice-President of the Union.” But he had to add: “unless 
ordered otherwise by the state legislatures.” The debate on the presidential election 
therefore continued as the state legislatures had to decide on how to select the presidential 
electors. In the pages of the “Massachusetts Centinel” an anonymous Anti-Federalist 
advocated the popular election of the presidential electors and attempted a first 
interpretation of the framer’s original intent. He opposed the election by the State 
legislature because, if that were the case, “there would be much time given for making an 
interest among the members, whereas no such interest could be made among Electors, as 
it is impossible to foresee who the people are to choose.” He concluded that this seemed 
to be “the object of the Constitution, in directing that all the Electors shall sit on the same 
day, so as to make it impossible for any communications of runners between.” The 
General Court of Massachusetts only partially fulfilled his claim, providing for a direct 
popular election by district, followed by a runoff election in the state legislature between 
the first two candidates from each district. Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, and 
Virginia choose direct popular election instead, while New Jersey and Georgia opted for 
the election by their state legislatures. North Carolina and Rhode Island, who still had not 
ratified the Constitution, did not participate in the first presidential election. Neither did 
New York, whose state legislature did not come to an agreement on the method of
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election of the presidential electors.
The case of New York sheds light on a critical aspect of the first presidential 
election. In New York the ratification debate sharpened party lines between the opposing 
coalitions that had formed after the split of the state’s independence coalition. As in the 
colonial era sharp partisan divisions characterized New York’s politics in the 1780s. 
These cleavages reflected conflicting social and economic interests. The Federalists 
represented the landed interests from the more established and wealthier urban and 
commercial southern counties, and were the heirs of the great families of Dutch 
aristocrats, who had dominated the state’s politics prior to the Revolution. The Anti- 
Federalists came from the ranks of the coalition of popular Whigs that had formed during 
the Revolution. Largely representative of the farmers from the northern counties and the 
rising bourgeoisie of the south, the Anti-Federalists were united under the leadership of 
Governor George Clinton. In the state’s ratifying convention forty-six delegates were 
Anti-Federalists, and only nineteen were Federalists. But not all Anti-Federalists opposed 
ratification. Many of them were dissatisfied with the Articles of Confederation and, 
particularly after Virginia ratified on July 2, 1788, they merely conditioned ratification on 
the introduction of constitutional amendments. The New York Convention finally ratified 
the Constitution on July 26, by a close vote of thirty to twenty-seven, but on the same day 
the Convention issued a circular letter which called for a second constitutional 
convention. Political turmoil continued as the Anti-Federalists started campaigning for 
constitutional amendments. Intense partisanship characterized the proceedings of the new
2 An American Citizen IV, “On the Federal Government,” Philadelphia, 21 October, 1787, DHRC, 13:436; 
Massachusetts Centinel, October 1, 1788, DHFFE 1:465.
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legislative assembly that began in December, with the Federalists controlling the Senate 
and the Anti-Federalists dominating the House. For almost two months the Senate and the 
House were unable to reach a compromise on the election of the presidential electors. On 
February 4, the date specified by Congress for the meeting of the Electoral College, the 
Senate refused to compromise on a bill for the appointment of the electors.
New York’s failure to participate in the first presidential election could probably 
be explained with the Federalists’ success in frustrating Clinton’s ambition to win the 
vice-presidency. Clinton maneuvered to secure the vice-presidency, so that he would be 
in a favorable position for promoting constitutional amendments. He could count on a 
wide support in his state and, with the help of his allies in Virginia, he hoped to rival John 
Adams, the Federalists’ favorite candidate for the office. Melancton Smith, with Clinton 
and Abraham Yates the leader of New York Anti-Federalists, deemed it “very probable” 
that his state and Virginia “would agree in the person for vice President -  and by their 
union might very probably determine the choice.” Smith was therefore willing to strike a 
compromise on the election of New York presidential electors, and on January 10 he told 
a friend that he was “of the opinion that the Legislature may yet choose.” But the 
Federalists did not need New York’s votes to secure Washington’s election to the 
presidency, and found it convenient to allow the deadlock. As early as December 30, the 
strategy of New York and Virginia Anti-Federalists for winning the vice-presidency was 
clear also to Federalist Edward Carrington, who came second in Virginia’s first district 
for the election of presidential electors. Carrington informed Henry Knox that Patrick 
Henry was making “a push to get electors appointed who shall vote for his Friend
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Clinton, as vice President,” and that it was “not unlikely that some votes for [Clinton] 
will come from this State & South Carolina.” Carrington continued that it was possible 
that he would be a presidential elector, and that he had been informed that Knox too 
could be appointed elector. Since he believed that it became “necessary for the Friends of 
the Government not to divide their votes too much,” Carrington asked Knox “some 
information upon this point, as it will stand in your quarter.” The next day the 
Pennsylvania Gazette, a Philadelphia paper close to the Federalists, announced the 
candidacy of John Adams as vice-president, and warned its readers that “[n]othing but an 
union in the choice of Mr. Adams can exclude Governor Clinton from the Vice- 
President’s chair.”
Smith, Hamilton, and Carrington’s words were not seemingly inconsistent with 
the alleged spirit of the presidential election. With the creation of the Electoral College, 
the framers apparently had wanted to confine the presidential electors to a sort of political 
limbo: the electors must operate in splendid independence from external influences, and 
would go back to their private lives once they elected the president. Indirect election was 
thus intended to provide that “filtration of talent” that only could foster 
“cosmopolitanism” against “localism.” It would therefore secure the national government 
into the hands of what John Adams called the “natural aristocracy,” a selected body of 
disinterested citizens. Perhaps one could borrow from Madison’s definition of 
representation in a republican government, and note that the Electoral College was
J Melancton Smith to John Smith, New York, January 10, 1789, DHFFE 3:315; Alexander Hamilton to 
Theodore Sedgwick, New York, January 29, 1789, DHFFE 3:369; Edward Carrington to Henry Knox, 
Richmond, December 30, 1788, DHFFE, 2:385-386; Pennsylvania Gazette, 31 December, 1788, DHFFE 
1:122.
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conceived “to refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the medium 
of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern the true interest of their 
country, and whose patriotism and love of justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to 
temporary or partial considerations.” Given the political environment of late eighteenth- 
century America, Madison was in fact advocating for a system of “virtual” rather than 
“actual” representation. The framers did not expect that such “refinement” would always 
work in the selection of the president, hence the provision for a runoff election in the 
House of Representatives, but they did trust the presidential electors more than common 
voters, because of the “virtuality” of indirect election.4
Yet the framers could not rely exclusively on the presidential electors’ status to 
obtain what they considered a sound method of selection. Although Washington’s 
election to the presidency was virtually certain, the election of the vice-president was 
more problematic. In those states where presidential electors were chosen by the state 
legislature, local parties with increasingly strong ties to other states might make the 
choice. And even in those states where the Electoral College worked as an indirect 
popular election, electioneering was, particularly with regard to the vice-presidency, 
influenced by the rapidly developing national coalitions. The latter were not yet the 
organized Federalist and Republican parties of the 1790s, but they were nevertheless vital 
in influencing the election. For example, in preparing for the 1789 elections,
4 Publius, “The Federalist X,” New York Daily Advertiser, November 22, 1787, DHRC 14:178. For the 
concepts o f “filtration of talent” and “extended sphere of government,” see Wood, Creation, chapter XII, 
but also Rakove, Original Meanings, chapter VIII. For Adams’ concept of “natural aristocracy,” see his A 
Defence o f the Constitutions of Government o f the United States o f America (Union, N.J.: The Lawbook 
Exchange, 2001). On the idea of the citizen’s disinterestedness, see Wood, “Interests and Disinterestedness 
in the Making of the Constitution,” in Beeman and Botein, eds., Beyond Confederation, 109.
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Pennsylvania Federalists and Anti-Federalists held apposite conventions to select their 
candidates to the Electoral College. Furthermore, as Maryland Federalist William 
Tilghman told Tench Coxe, the Constitution was “defective, in not obliging the Electors 
to vote for a President & vice president, distinctly.” If the electors intended to concentrate 
their votes on two candidates, one as president and the other as his vice-president, it was 
conceivable that might mismanage their vote and elect the wrong person to the 
Presidency. The problem was solved in 1804, with the introduction of the twelfth 
amendment, that helped parties to organize around a national ticket for both the president 
and the vice-president. But in the first presidential election Tilghman, who was one of 
Maryland presidential electors, still had to ask Coxe who was “talked of to the Northward 
as Vice President.”5
The election of John Adams as vice-president therefore entailed the intrusion of 
party politics in the pristine isolation of the Electoral College. And it soon became 
apparent that, despite the provisions of the Electoral College, some sort of national 
coordination was needed to facilitate the popular election of the presidential electors. In 
the first federal elections the Electoral College worked as a substitute for party 
organization on the national scale. Thus, it is perhaps ironic that the Electoral College, 
which was allegedly meant to prevent the influence of parties over the presidential 
election, was in fact one of the means by which national parties first began to organize in 
the United States.
5 William Tilghman to Tench Coxe, Chestertown, January 2, 1789, DHFFE 2:180.
CONCLUSION
The Electoral College nicely fitted the constitutional framework designed by the 
framers. With the creation of the Electoral College, the framers preserved both the 
separation of powers and state’s rights, two major features of the compromise reached at 
Philadelphia. While avoiding what they considered its practical and political 
shortcomings, the framers also upheld the principle of popular election of the national 
executive. The Electoral College can therefore be considered as one of the means by 
which the framers were able to make the constitutional machine work and stabilize the 
federal government at its very inception.
Shlomo Slonim, who has written probably the most accurate account of the 
framing of the Electoral College, maintained that the framers were primarily concerned 
with issues such as “separation of powers, limited terms of office, reeligibility, rotation in 
office, and devices for minimizing electoral corruption,” and most of all they needed “to 
resolve the central dispute at Philadelphia, namely the large state-small state 
controversy.”1
This is also how contemporary supporters of the Electoral College view its 
creation at Philadelphia. They underline the enduring importance of the Electoral College 
for the protection of federalism and representative democracy within the constitutional
1 Slonim, “Electoral College,” 57-58.
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framework, and praise the framers for having established the foundation of today’s 
electoral system.
Something is nevertheless missing from this interpretation. It is apparent that the 
framers held a concept of representation that was more traditional than modem, and that 
the Electoral College was the constitutional provision that best embodied that concept. 
Given the political and technological environment of the time, that was probably the only 
form of representation that made a presidential election possible. Yet the formation, 
through the Constitution, of a more aristocratic national elite was precisely one of the 
framers’ primary objectives. This has been the classic argument of those Progressive and 
neo-Progressive historians who have understood the Constitution as a Thermidorean 
reaction and have maintained that the Electoral College was originally devised to keep 
the common people from choosing the president.
Slonim has rejected the claim of the Progressive historians, maintaining that 
“antimajoritarianism was by no means the primary motivation behind the creation of the 
Electoral College.” Instead he argued that “[o]nly a few delegates were opposed in 
principle to direct election of the executive,” and that their opposition reflected “not
2 Other account of the framing of the Electoral College are in Lucius Wildemerding, Jr., The Electoral 
College (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1958); John P. Roche, “The Founding Fathers: A 
Reform Caucus in Action,” American Political Science Review 55 (Dec., 1961), 799-816; Neal R. Peirce, 
The People’s President: The Electoral College in American History and the Direct-Vote Alternative (New 
York: Simon and Schuster, 1968); Tadahisa Kuroda, The Origins of the Twelfth Amendment: The Electoral 
College in the Early Republic, 1787-1804 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood, 1994). For the interpretation by 
contemporary supporters of the Electoral College Cfr. Judith A. Best, The choice o f the people? Debating 
the electoral college (Boston: Rowman & Littlefield, 1996); Gary L. Gregg II, “The Origins and Meaning 
of the Electoral College,” in Gregg, ed., Securing Democracy: Why We Have an Electoral College 
(Wilmington, Del.: ISI Books, 2001), 34; Robert M. Hardaway, The Electoral College and the 
Constitution: The Case for Preserving Federalism (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994).
3 Cfr. J. Allen Smith, The Spirit o f American Government (New York: Macmillian, 1907); Charles A. 
Beard, An economic interpretation of the constitution (New York: Free Press, 1941); Merril Jensen, The 
making of the American constitution (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1964).
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mistrust of representative democracy, but a conviction that the extent of the country and 
the difficulty of communication did not permit informed selection of a national 
candidate.” Slonim’s argument reflects that of the majority of historians who have dealt 
with the subject.4
Slonim effectively illustrated the genius of the Electoral College in solving an 
array of constitutional questions regarding the election of the chief executive. Slonim’s 
dismissal of antimajoritarianism and indeed of partisan objectives on the part of the 
framers, however, seems not convincing. This becomes apparent if one does not stop at 
considering the records of the Constitutional Convention but proceeds on to examining 
the ratification debate and, most of all, the actual proceedings of the first federal 
elections. The latter, in particular, allows one to look beyond the Republican rhetoric that 
clothed the arguments of the framers as well as those of the Federalists and their 
opponents, and to appreciate the extent to which partisanship was instrumental to the 
actual practice of electioneering.
The first federal elections were a Federalist triumph and Washington’s rise to the 
presidency was never in doubt. Had the framers chosen a system different from the 
Electoral College, the result of the presidential election would have most likely been the 
same. It is not clear, however, who might have been elected as vice-president, 
particularly in a direct popular election that would have probably dispersed the people’s
4 Slonim, “Electoral College,” 57-58. For similar account of the framing of the Electoral College, see 
Lucius Wildemerding, Jr., The Electoral College (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1958); 
John P. Roche, “The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action,” American Political Science Review 
55 (Dec., 1961), 799-816; NealR. Peirce, The People’s President: The Electoral College in American 
History and the Direct-Vote Alternative (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968); Tadahisa Kuroda, The 
Origins of the Twelfth Amendment: The Electoral College in the Early Republic, 1787-1804 (Westport, 
Conn.: Greenwood, 1994).
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votes while increasing partisanship in areas already in turmoil, such as western 
Massachusetts and North Carolina’s backcountry. Perhaps, had the election been direct, 
the candidacy of the Federalist John Adams to the vice-presidency would have 
encountered more resistance that it did. Clinton, an Anti-Federalist and a popular figure 
at the time, might have taken advantage of a direct election better than Adams.
Furthermore, with no constitutional provision for separate ballots for president 
and vice-president, like the one introduced in 1804 with the twelfth amendment, there 
existed the possibility that the Federalists would inadvertently cast less ballots for 
Washington than for his running mate. There is evidence that party discipline worked 
among presidential electors as the Federalist leadership influenced the vote in the 
Electoral College to keep such a scenario from taking place. Arguably it would have been 
more difficult for the Federalist leadership to direct the common voters instead of 
presidential electors, had the common voters been the ones to cast the ballot to elect the 
president and the vice-president. By establishing a mechanism of indirect election of both 
the president and the vice-president, the framers favored the exercise of patronage and 
promoted political organization on a continental scale. They therefore helped the better- 
connected Federalists not only to secure Washington’s election from the unexpected 
liabilities of the electoral system, but also to ensure the success of Adams’s candidacy to 
the vice-presidency.
The framers allegedly hoped to place the presidential election process above 
partisanship. From their firm condemnation of party politics, they seemingly believed 
that presidential elections could operate in an unrealistic political vacuum. Carl Becker
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once noted: “If the motives of the founding fathers in devising [the Electoral College] 
were of the highest, it must be said that their grasp of political realities, ordinarily so sure, 
failed them in this instance.” The Electoral College, Becker concluded, “was in the nature 
of an academic invention which ignored experience in the vain expectation that, in this 
one instance for this high purpose, politicians would cease to be politicians, would divest 
themselves of party prejudice and class and sectional bias, and be all for the time being 
noble Brutuses inspired solely by pure love of liberty and the public good.” Historians 
have long agreed that the framers could not have predicted the emergence of national 
parties that in the 1790s came to dominate American politics. In The Idea o f  a Party 
System: The Rise o f  Legitimate Opposition in the United States 1780-1840, Richard 
Hofstadter provided the classic statement of this standard interpretation. But if the 
framers could not have apprehended how quickly the presidential election would become 
a highly politicized contest, this does not mean that they really meant to keep the 
presidential election out of the domain of politics and that they were ready to give up 
control of the political process. The motives of the framers, and those of the Federalists 
who echoed the framers’ anti-party rhetoric in the ratification debate, were not 
necessarily “of the highest.”5
In the ratification debate and the first federal election, particularly with regard to 
the election of the vice-president, party politics played a role that went beyond what the 
framers had predicted at Philadelphia. But those Federalists and Anti-Federalists who 
spoke against the evils of partisanship, including many of the former delegates at the
5 Carl Becker, “The Will of the People,” Yale Review, March 1945, 389. Hofstadter, Idea o f a Party System, 
cit..
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Philadelphia Convention, actively campaigned for electors they trusted and sought to 
organize the Electoral College to avoid the unintended shortcomings of the simultaneous 
election of both the president and the vice-president. Thus, in the first federal election the 
Electoral College worked as a substitute for the electoral machine that each party would 
soon build into national coalitions. Not for the first time did the rhetoric of virtue give 
way to the reality of politics.
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